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Greetings, once again, from your bi-coastal copresidents-Michael in Eugene, Oregon, and
Paula in Syracuse, New York. As we write to you
during these first days of August, we find
ourselves reflecting on SALT's accomplishments
with considerable pride. Yet, as we look ahead, we
feel as if we can ill-afford a moment's rest.
All of us are gratified-and enonnously
relieved-by the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger. There is, of course, no
issue more central to the work of SALT than affinnative action in law school admissions. In
1976, SALT filed an amicus brief in Bakke, and, a generation later in 2003, an amicus brief
in Grutter. In addition, so many of you, as SALT members, spoke out in various ways through
the media, building momentum as oral arguments drew near. Our half-page ad in The
Washington Post was widely-read and well-received, and SALT's press conference and participation in the Washington, D.C., rally on April 1st demonstrated, once again, SALT's commitment to activism beyond the ivory tower. (See commentary on the Grutterdecision starting
onpage7.)
We were also deeply heartened by the Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. The teaching
of-and living with-Bowers v. Hardwick, year after year sincel 986, has been a personally
painful experience for us all, and Justice Kennedy's eloquence lifted a huge burden and
provided an occasion for some celebration. As you are well aware, SALT signed on to an
amicus brief in Lawrence, and SALT members, individually and as part of our committee,
have been long-standing leaders in the struggles for equality and justice facing gay and
lesbian communities. (See commentary on the Lawrence opinion starting on page 2.)
These victories will be short-lived unless we remain vigilant. We know all too well, for
instance, that the Bush Administration and its conservative supporters are seeking to avenge
these "losses" through nominees to the federal bench, including, perhaps, the Supreme Court
itself. Thus, the work of our Judicial Nominations committee, chaired by Bob Dinerstein
(American University), is of dire importance. We urge you to join the committee or to offer
your expertise on an ad hoc basis. (See news of the committee's work starting on page 25.)
Further, having been provided a veritable blueprint by Justice Scalia in Grutter, antiaffinnative action activists are planning the next assaults on diversity and fairness in higher
education. Through our monitoring efforts, we must ensure that the Court's recognition of
the importance of diversity and equal opportunity in higher education are achieved by our
institutions.
Presidents' Column continued on page 2
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Commentary on Lawrence v.

Similarly, the backlash against the

Lawrence opinion and against gains

toward greater societal inclusion by the
LGBT community must be countered by
coalition efforts that recognize the
importance of equality and fairness for all
persons, irrespective of sexuality.
SALT's work continues on many other
fronts, as well. First Monday, October 6th,
is not far off, and we ask you to plan

"[W]efind ourselves
reflecting on SALT's
accomplishments with
considerable pride.
Yet, as we look ahead,
we feel as if we can
ill-afford a moment's
rest."
public interest/social justice-oriented
events on your campus. Feel free to contact
our First Monday committee chair, Tayyab
Mahmud (visiting at Seattle University),
for assistance.Also, we are moving ahead
with our diversity survey, as an alternative
to the poisonous rankings in U.S. News &
World Report; with our proposals for
alternatives to conventional bar exams;
with our critique of the lawschool
admission process; and with our efforts to
challenge the Solomon Amendment.
The opportunity for us to work with
the SALT membership remains enormously
rewarding.As an all-volunteer organization, our continuing effectiveness depends
on your willingness to join a committee,
offer fund-raising suggestions, or contribute financially. Remember: SALTis the
progressive voice in legal education.Your
active support ensures that we will be
heard.
SALT Equalizer

Putting Lawrence v.
Texas to Work
Marc R. Poirier, Seton Hall University
School of Law

Lawrence v. Texas is a wonderful and-to

Court's opposite position in Bowers
just seventeen years ago.
exas Even in areas that are not doctrinally related, Lawrence is likely to
serve as an agent of further change.
Leading advocacy organizations like
Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund and the American Civil Liberties
Union's Lesbian and GayRights Project
have already promulgated post-Lawrence
agendas, seeking to capitalize on its
momentum. Lawrence is also triggering a
vigorous reaction from the religious right.
It sees Lawrence as a threat to traditional
marriage and familystructure, and
another indication of the decline of
morality in our society. Calls have gone
out for a federal constitutional amendment to "protect" opposite sex marriage,
and for a renewed effort to overturn Roe v.
Wade. The libertarian right, which
opposed the Texas sodomylaw on the
general principle of limited government,
now claims Lawrence as its own victory, a
different position from that of the
religious right, but one also out of
alignment with progressive causes.
The Lawrence decision on privacy is
doctrinally limited in subtle but important ways. The privacy right protected
seems to involve sexual activity in a
context of binary intimacy, primarily in
the home. We could also identify these as
"decisional," "relational," and "zonal"
privacy interests, following the amicus
brief filed on behalf of international
human rights groups, with Mary Robinson
as the lead plaintiff. One might question
whether Lawrence is altogether clear
about a constitutional right to casual sex
(not intimate) or sex involving more than
two people (not binary, perhaps not
intimate), although it seems likely that
Lawrence will be read to prohibit
criminalizing adult consensual sexual
activity that occurs within the walls of the
home.

Te

me-unexpected victory. It overturns the
Texas same-sex only sodomy law, not on a
narrow Equal Protection ground as some
had predicted, but in a broad holding
finding a constitutional privacy right to
consensual sexual activity in intimate
relations in private locations. Byoverruling Bowers v. Hardwick in the way it
does, Lawrence removes a tremendous
stigma from gays and lesbians throughout
the country. Even though sodomylaws
were rarely enforced, they were often
invoked to brand gays and lesbians as
potential criminals in contexts running
from adoption to discrimination in
employment. The amicus brief in
Lawrence that SALT signed addressed just
this issue of cultural shift as a basis for
overturning Bowers.Lawrence affects the
whole country, not just the thirteen states
that still had sodomy laws, as a cultural
marker of an ongoing change, an
increasing acceptance of homosexuality as
a normal variant of human sexual and
affectional activity.
Many legal, political and social
victories over the past few years have
brought us to this point. The larger
instrument of change here is visibility.
Decades of standing up to vicious stereotypes and insisting on fair treatment-at
first by a fewcourageous individuals, often
at great personal sacrifice- has shifted
cultural norms.ASupreme Court opinion
acknowledging this change is extraordinarily important, especially given the

Poirier continued on page 4
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It Ain't Just About Sex

Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas

Elvia Arriola, Northern Illinois University College of Law

Right after the Supreme Court decided on June 26, 2003, that my consensual sexual acts as
a lesbian aren't the goverriment's business, I asked two friends what they thought of the
amazing landmark decision in Lawrence v. Texas. One said, "I don't trust it. ... Someone
will just come back with some way of getting at us through different means." Another said it
was "wonderful . . . . It'll have a positive impact in other areas of gay people's lives." For
those of us who have followed the direction of the law since the devastating blow in Bowers
v. Hardwick, which rejected the notion of a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy,
Lawrence comes full circle to the obviously right result. But maybe that result is one that
the nation wasn't ready for in 1986, when Bowers was decided. I wonder, though, what
makes us more ready now? Is it just the end product of a long campaign that had so many
mixed results following Bowers-from the military's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, to the
recognition of marriage rights by Hawaii, to a backlash with the federal Defense of Marriage
Act (DOMA), to a civil union law in Vermont but several mini-state DOMAs, to the ongoing
struggle by universities to hang on to their federal funds when they try to keep the homophobic military from interviewing their students? Is it a promise or something to deflect our
attention away from more serious threats to our civil liberties (e.g., the PATRIOT Act) raised
by the fallout of 9-11?
At a time when the separation of church and state is being continually challenged, this
decision affirms the right to say that the government can't tell me what to believe about
what's moral or not in sex; it can't tell me whom to love or whom to marry; it must stay out
of my bedroom unless what I'm doing isn't consensual and may injure someone who is a
minor or who can't consent. Along with the affirmative action decision in Grutter v.
Bollinger, these decisions tell me the work of the progressive is long, arduous, unpredictable.
It gives me a little faith in the system just when I'm tired of grinding my teeth from the
latest anti-terrorist measures being announced by the Department ofJustice. But I need to
tell my friends that the distrust of one and the optimism of the other are both realistic.
Arriola continued on page 6

A Bottom Line Victory

How Far We've Come

Pat Cain, University of Iowa College of Law

Art Leonard, New York Law School

Kennedy's decision in Lawrence explicitly
overruled Bowers v. Hardwick. I view that
as a major victory. While Kennedy was not
clear about the exact content of the
"liberty" interest at stake in the case (e.g.,
he does not call it a right to privacy), he
was perlectly clear that criminal laws
banning intimate sexual relationships
between consenting adults in private are
unconstitutional. That is the bottom line.
This opinion is the final proof that those
GLB rights activists who supported
Kennedy's nomination so many years ago
had the right instincts.

I am particularly struck by the ironic
justice of this historic opinion being
written by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Jr.,
who was appointed to the seat vacated by
Lewis F. Powell, Jr., who cast the deciding
vote against us in Bowers v. Hardwick 17
years ago. That everybody involved with the
case expected a victory-the only things in
doubt being which theory the Court would
use and how big the majority would beshows how far the lesbian and gay rights
movement has come in the intervening
years. On to bigger things!!!

SALT Equalizer
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Understanding Law's
Exclusionary Power
Joan W. Howarth, Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

My difficulty taking in Lawrence taught
me something about the exclusionary
power of law. Even as I read the breaking
newswire story that Lawrence had
overruled Bowers, I had no capacity to
believe it. Afew minutes later, even as I
readJustice Kennedy's repudiation of
Bowers and cried tears of relief, some very
primitive instinct toward self-protection
had my brain racing to consider every
possible scenario in which this could be an
elaborate hoax. This profound and
irrational wariness surprised and unsettled
me. I had taught Bowers countless times,
assigned papers on "How Bowers changed
my life," assigned Michael Hardwick's oral
history, shown a Michael Hardwick video
in class, and considered myself relentless in
refusing to minimize the bigotry and pain
of Bowers. But I did not understand how
much Bowers had gotten to me, and how
central it has been to my very personal
understanding of law's exclusionary power,
until I found myself unable to trust that it
was really gone. Now I think about
Mccleskey v. Kemp, which accommodated systemic racism in the imposition of
the death penalty. McCleskey and Bowers
were both landmark 5-4 decisions in which
Justice Powell provided the swing vote and
then reportedly expressed doubts after
leaving the bench. I wonder what it will
take to overruleMcCleskey, and I understand more deeply how powerful the
repudiation of Mccleskey could be.
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police power authority to prohibit
activities deemed to be harmful to the
Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas community or to individuals. The
distinction between harm and mere
moral opprobrium is not always
Poirier:
certain, though, and is sure to be the
subject of future cases and law review
continuedfrom page 2
articles.
Lawrence does not answer clearly
Doctrinally, it is interesting that
whether there is a right to sexual activity
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
in places not quite so private, e.g., in a car,
Lawrence rejects aview of Due Process
at a music festival, in the woods, on the
liberty rights as rooted in long tradition.
beach, in a sex club (not physically as
private as a home, not intimate, perhaps
not binary). The idea of semi-private
''Lawrence [is] a
sexual activity has not achieved the same
cultural acceptance as the intimate sex in
cultural marker ofan
the home protected by Lawrence, and
ongoing change, an
probably makes most Americans uncomincreasing acceptance
fortable. It is of concern nevertheless
because most arrests of gay men for sexual
ofhomosexuality as a
activity are brought under public indenormal variant of
cency and lewd conduct statutes, and these
human sexual and
arrests are likely to continue after
affectional activity.
Lawrence. Among the other issues
unaddressed by Lawrence are the rights of
[But] SALT and its
transgendered/transsexual folk (no sexual
members need to keep
activity, no intimacy, not limited to
their eyes on the
home).
Justice Scalia's dissent, like the
politicalfallout ... "
conservative positions it reflects, claims
that if a state is not allowed to make laws
based on its own moral determinations,
Instead he places emphasis on the
then laws against bigamy, same-sex
traditions of the last fifty years. Bowers
marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
was wrong when decided, he writes, because
masturbation, adultery, fornication,
it should have noted an emerging
bestiality, and obscenity will also fall.
recognition that liberty includes protection
Elsewhere he adds child pornography to the
for adults in deciding how to conduct their
list. Much of this is hot air. While
activities in their private lives concerning
masturbation and fornication among
sex. The Grutter v. Bollinger majority
consenting adults in private are now
also recognizes that affirmative action in
probably constitutionally protected, the
some forms, while appropriate now, may
other categories may or may not be reached
not be appropriate in twenty-five more
by Lawrence, for reasons varying from lack
years. (See Grutter commentary on pages
of intimacy (prostitution is commercial,
7-15.) Are we looking at a Court that is
therefore arguably not intimate) to
willing to be explicit about viewing
governmental definition of a conferred
fundamental constitutional issues
status (bigamy laws protect marriage) to
through the lens of pragmatism and
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evolution of social norms? Lawrence also
uses human rights decisions from Europe
to make its argument about cultural shift,
an interesting development that is
anathema to conservative members of the
Court. Similarly, Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence in Grutter leads off with a
reference to international norms for
affirmative action. The parallel in
arguments is interesting, especially as
reference to international practices or
precedents is also anathema to some
conservative members of the Court.
The Lawrence decision does not
address discrimination law directly,
although as discussed above it does good
work by showing that homosexuality has
become more mainstream as a part of
American culture in the last fifty years. On
discrimination issues, we may see a
somewhat ironic flip-flop on the statusconduct argument. After Bowers and
before Lawrence, GLB advocates in various
contexts argued that even though same sex
sexual activity could be criminalized per
Bowers, just because an individual selfidentified as gay should not permit anyone
to assume thats/he was actually engaging
in or likely to engage in sexual activity. A
distinction was thus drawn between status
and conduct. After Lawrence,we may see a
strategy that seeks to link homosexual
status explicitly to sexual conduct. The
argument would be that discriminating
against GLB individuals is indirectly
burdening a protected constitutional right
to private sexual activity. Thus, GLB people
may seek to be presumed to engage in
sexual activity. Presumed conduct would
protect openly gay status.
The issue of gay men and lesbians in
the military may or may not be affected by
the Lawrence decision. As of this year, the
tenth year of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy, more than 9000 GLBT
servicemembers have been processed out of
the military, according to Servicemembers
Legal Defense Network, an advocacy group
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that does work in this area. Acase has
already been filed relying on Lawrence to
challenge the expulsion of a career
servicemember on the basis of his homosexuality. But there is a traditional judicial
deference to military decisions, and
national security may well serve as a trump
argument at this particular moment in
history. Again, visibility and cultural
acceptance in other contexts will probably
eventually erode military opposition to
openly GLBT people in the military, but it
may take another generation, until the
career military personnel who were
teenagers in the 1980s become commanding officers.
Justice O'Connor wrote a concurring
opinion in Lawrence based on Equal
Protection doctrine. In her view, a state
could prohibit sodomy if it wished, but
there was no evident reason for Texas to
prohibit sodomy between same sex couples
and yet allow it between opposite sex
couples. O'Connor's opinion holds that
mere moral disapproval, like animus, is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review.
She thus applies the "rational basis with
bite" approach of Romer v. Evans. It is
worth noting that the day after Lawrence
came down, the Court granted certiorari
and then vacated and remanded the
decision in Limon v. Kansas, a case in
which state law treated consensual sex
between same sex teenagers much more
harshly than between consenting opposite
sex teenagers. The state court opinion in
Limon cited Bowers, but the constitutional challenge was an Equal Protection
challenge. It is easy to read too much into a
GVR order, but perhaps this is a signal that
the lower courts must take seriously the
Equal Protection argument not addressed
by the majority in Lawrence. Equal
Protection arguments are likely to be
crucial for status issues like marriage/
domestic partnership/civil union, which
are not linked directlyto the privacy right

SALT Equalizer

articulated inlawrence.
The classic question is "What is to
be done?" SALT joined one of the
amicus briefs in Lawrence, and SALT's
activity on judicial nominations has
included opposition to candidates with

Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas

"We need to consider
how SALT can best
facilitate the often
local activism for
change that makes
possible larger
victories such as
Lawrence."
terrible records on GLBT issues. Generally
speaking, though, SALT has typically
focused its organizational energies on
legal education and legal institutions.
Much SALT work in the area of GLBT issues
has addressed the enforcement of law
school nondiscrimination policies in
recruiting, specifically concerning on
campus recruiting by the military. That is
to say that SALT has focused on law school
implementation of the AALS nondiscrimination policy and the challenges posed by
the Solomon Amendment. Analysis of
Lawrence and attention to the follow-up
programs being developed in light of
Lawrence should be part of anylaw
school's GLBT presence, and could fit
within the amelioration obligation.
Within the specific confines of the law
school, GLBT advocacy sometimes finds
itself in some conflict with other civil
rights work, and SALT would do well to
explore how to address coalition work here.
Although Solomon Amendment work
is important, it sometimes has the feel of
the tangential, a symbolic battle in which
the military seeks to commandeer the

Page 5

resources of law schools against their will.
Litigation that challenges the Solomon
Amendment seems likely, and will bring
the First Amendment issues to the fore,
making the issue seem far less tangential.
And a reversal of the military's "Don't ask,
don't tell" policy would make the whole
issue moot.
More broadly, SALT and its members
need to keep their eyes on the political
Poirier continued on page 6

A Letter from Sylvia Law
Following is the text ofa letter sent by
New York University School ofLaw
Professor Sylvia A. Law to United States
Supreme Court Associate justice Anthony
Kennedy on July 1, 2003.
DearJustice Kennedy:
Thank you for your magnificent
decision and opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas.
Your contribution to the complex task
of defining the liberty protected by the
constitution is as sage and eloquent as any
Supreme Court opinion sinceJustice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman.
Your elucidation of history and its role
in constitutional decision making is
informed and wise.
Most important, your opinion reflects
profound empathy and respect for human
dignity.
You will no doubt receive many critical
letters. I hope not as manyor as nasty as
those directed to Justice Blackmun in
response to Roe. But many of us are deeply
grateful to you.
Sincerely,
Sylvia A. Law
August 2003
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Poirier:

Commentary on Lawrence v. Texas

continued from page 5

Arriola:
continuedfrom page 3

When the one who said "wonderful" prefaced her commentary with her understanding of the
outrageous facts that led to the appeal-the police barged into the home of two men engaged
in sex whose neighbor had made a false 911 call-I briefly educated her on the reality that
such incidents occur frequently in the homes and neighborhoods of those who are vulnerable
to police abuse because of their class and race, a reality she doesn't have too think of often as
a white lesbian. I'd have to agree with my distrusting friend that Lawrence is wonderful but
it's only an important step forward and it
doesn't take care of potential backlashes nor
does it guarantee against other people abusing
"Is Lawrence a
the right of privacy in the name of antipromise or something
terrorism or other conduct that isn't queer sex.
to deflect our
IfLawrence is the Brown case for sexual
minorities then there is much to applaud, but
attention away from
hard work must follow for the sexual minority
more serious threats
community to feel it has won the campaign
to our civil
for its citizenship rights.
lib'ber ties.....?"
We can hope thatl.awrencewill have a
domino effect, but how and for whom? I think
of how Lawrence is a coup for queer sex, but
what does it really do for my friend who, as I write, is recovering from transsexual reconstructive surgery? She suffers mistreatment not necessarily because of her choice in love but just
for being "too queer" as a transgender. Lawrence covers the issue of sex behind closed doors,
but does it really handle the issue of identity-based discrimination, i.e., the impact of sheer
prejudice? One would hope that is what Kennedy meant in stating that the penalty under the
Texas law was minute, but the stigma is harsh. It's the impact of being labeled a deviant by
one's society or being treated as a second class citizen just for being different from any
dominant majority. O'Connor covered this issue to some extent in focusing on Texas' not
having a problem with sodomyper se but only with gay sodomy which, she felt, made the
statute illegal on equal protection grounds.
Yet my mixed reactions aside, this is a satisfying result to those of us who have labored as
scholars, lawyers and expert witnesses for years to challenge the unfair stereotypes that have
led us to lose jobs, homes, child custody, and essential medical treatment. Kennedy's
majority opinion rejected the logic of Bowers and its screaming homophobic opinions.
Burger's opinion was stunning then as Scalia's dissent in Lawrence amazes one now. To him
it's about a culture war. I don't think so. It's more than that. It's about those of us who
fundamentally disagree with Scalia's view that this isn't about liberty rights, or that a life
partner choice and the privacy of our bedroom fall into the same category of governmental
concerns as making it illegal to work more than 60 hours in a bakery! Scalia maysee this
opinion as an ushering in of constitutional disorder. I welcome it as a necessary chaos to
balance out recent government threats to the Bill of Rights.

SALT Equalizer
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fallout from Lawrence. The religious right
will push for an ultraconservative Supreme
Court appointment and a constitutional
amendment around opposite sex marriage.
Progressive law professors will need to work
in coalition with reproductive rights
groups as well as GLBT advocacy groups to
counter these conservative demands. And of
course, much work remains to be done on
the GLBT front: marriage (or perhaps
equivalents); adoption and custody;
antidiscrimination work, including the
military issue, which I see as especially
important because it undermines the
gender stereotyping of the military;
transsexual/transgender issues; issues in
schools, including curriculum, the
presence of Gay/Straight clubs, and antibullying policies. I would also include an
expanded scope of privacy protection for
some more stigmatized types of sexual
activity. Much of this work is at the local
or state level. Much of it is not even legal
but is about addressing local practices and
policies in private institutions like
corporations, universities and churches.
Visibility is, as ever, at the center of the
process of change here. Both the ACLU and
Lambda Legal offer websites addressing
ways in which individuals can get involved
to effect change at the local level. SALT's
hosting of a Solomon Amendment website
certainlyfits within this approach to
facilitating local political action and
change. SALT's members are a busy lot,
sometimes even-<lare I say-over-committed. We need to consider how SALTcan best
facilitate the often local activism for
change that makes possible larger victories
such as Lawrence. Such activism on the
local level is also what will translate the
promise of decisionssuch as Lawrence
into further advances in civil rights for us
all.
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Rejoice and Refuel: Reflections on Grutter

Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger

Emily M.S. Houh, University of Cincinnati College of Law

When I first got word of the Supreme Court's ruling in Grutter v. Bollinger on that June
day, I literally jumped out of my chair in my office, squealed with delight, and began
running and jumping down the hallways of our faculty floor, yelling, "They ruled in favor of
Michigan! The policy's been upheld! WOO-HOO!" Looking back on it now, perhaps this
wasn't the most appropriate way to respond, given that I had been in residence at my new
school for only a couple of weeks. I probably should have just calmly e-mailed our faculty
listserv about Michigan's victory, as several of my more seasoned colleagues had. But then, it
felt really good to be exuberant! When years of individual and collective anxiety, anger, hard
work, and coalition building pay off in such a concrete way, why not leap for joy? Never mind
that I hadn't yet read the opinion; at that moment, I was ecstatic for one reason alone: We
had won!
I say "we" not only as a member of a progressive community that supports affirmative
action and, more broadly, the dismantling of white supremacy and sexual subordination; I
say "we" also because I am a graduate of the University of Michigan Law School ('96) . I
graduated a couple years before Ms. Grutter, et al., filed the lawsuit, and had participated in
the Law School's Minority Affairs Program ("MAP") as a first-year student. Within our
cohort, 1 rumors had always circulated about irate majority students who claimed that we had
"exclusive" access to imagined "special perks," as well as of disgruntled majority applicants
whose places we had "stolen." As we studiedBakke2 in our constitutional law classes, we
wondered collectively if and when the ugly rumors of impending lawsuits challenging the
constitutionality of the MAP program and the admissions policy would ever materialize. Only
a few years later, of course, the rumors of the admissions lawsuit proved true, and the Grutter
and Gratz complaints were filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, where I was clerking at the time. My stake in the outcome of the Michigan cases,
however, grew not only out of a general commitment to social equality and a temporal and
physical proximity to the litigation, but also out of my experiences as a law student at
Michigan.
During those three years the administration at Michigan saw a great deal of organizing
by progressive students: We were African-American, Latino/a, Asian Pacific-American,
American Indian, lesbian, gay, and bisexual, straight, and white. We joined and participated
with a vengeance in public interest and reading groups, organized conferences and panels,
started a journal, and organized to demand curricular changes and diversity in faculty hiring.
We fought about strategies, programs, and the ultimate goals of our organizing. We pulled
all-nighters doing work that did not involve preparing for class, but taught us to be good
strategists and activists. We missed classes in order to meet what we believed were more
important deadlines. We did the hard work that is always involved in good coalition activism,
and were rewarded with some positive and permanent changes to the institution, incredible
and lasting friendships, and a heartfelt sense of collective empowerment and purpose. I am
certain that my classmates from Michigan are still driven in their practice, teaching, and
writing by the same principles and passions that drove us in law school. Without one
another-that is, if the student body had not been as diverse as it had been at the time-I'm
not sure where we'd all be or what we'd be doing now. Would we be (even more) jaded and
embittered (than we are) about our law school experiences? Would we be burned out by our
practice, whether public interest or big firm? Would we have stopped feeling a sense of
Reflections continued on page 8
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Jam Tomorrow and Jam
Yesterday: 1
Reflections on Grutter,
Gratz, and the Future of
Affirmative Action2
SALT Co-President Paula C. Johnson,
Syracuse University College of Law

When the Supreme Court issued the
intensely anticipated decisions in the
University of Michigan cases, Grutter v.
Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger, many
of us who were wary of the Court's position
on affirmative action found much to
applaud in the Court's opinions. For the
first time since Regents of Univ. of Calif
v. Bakke, in 1978, the U.S. Supreme Court
reaffirmed the constitutionality of raceconscious admissions in higher educational programs. In its ruling, the Court in
Grutter (5-4) left no doubt that it adopted
Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke,
in which diversity in higher education was
found to constitute a compelling state
interest. As Justice O'Connor wrote,
"[T]oday we endorse Justice Powell's view
that student body diversity is a compelling
state interest that can justify the use of
race in university admissions."
Moreover, the Court issued an unequivocal pronouncement on the importance of racial and ethnic diversity in
higher education and to the society at
large. In this regard,Justice O'Connor
stated in Grutter, "In order to cultivate a
set of leaders with legitimacy in the eyes of
the citizenry, it is necessary that the path to
leadership be visibly open to talented and
qualified individuals of every race and
ethnicity." Such strong recognition of the
governmental interest in racial and ethnic
diversity is a salutary development in the
jam 1bmorrow continued on page 11
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law students, undergraduate students
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger from colleges around the country
intending to apply to the Law School,
and high school students from various
public schools in the city of Detroit.
Reflections:
Having grown up in the Detroit suburbs, I
... continuedfrom page 7
can attest to the chronic residential and
educational segregation and inequality
gratitude for and pride in the work of those
that continue to plague not only the
who came before and after us? Would we
metropolitan Detroit area. At trial, the
have been sapped of the energy and longstudent intervenors presented thorough and
term commitment required to engage in
compelling evidence and testimony about
social justice activism? Aloss in Grutter
the realities and impact of this segregation
would have meant not only a major
and inequality, thus bringing to light
setback in the struggle toward
what was really at stake in a material
sociopolitical equality and justice; it
would have meant personal defeat, in the
deepest sense. Perhaps that is why I
"We should. .. continue
couldn't refrain from running the
to feel and express
hallways on that June day.
exuberance over the
* * *
victory won in Grutter,
Yet, looking back on those law school
experiences, I can't help but wonder
but as we do so, we
whether we could have done better. After
must be sure to reall, although we had some success,
fuel for the many
Michigan's very large faculty still includes
very few tenured or tenure-track faculty of
battles to come and
color, and every year student groups
plan for a time when
working together at Michigan solicit
we can finally go on
alumni support as they diligently continue
the offensive."
to fight for faculty and curricular diversity.
As a Michigan alum, it is deeply satisfying
to know that in part because of the Grutter
sense for so many: the struggle for racial
decision, student activism will continue to
and educational equality and the imporflourish at the University of Michigan Law
tance of integration in that struggle.
School, even where this most certainly will
Proudly, SALT, in an amicus brief filed in
translate into students continuing to give
support of Michigan, 3 also made compelhell to the administration and faculty for
ling arguments to the Supreme Court
their own homogeneity. The best example
about the effects of residential and
of student activism at Michigan, of course,
educational segregation and inequality in
can be found simply by looking to the
metropolitan Detroit; Justice Ginsburg
Grutter litigation itself. Fortunately for
noted these effects in her concurring
all of us, the student intervenors in
opinion. 4 And while the student interveGrutter had the courage to stake their
nors were neither credited nor mentioned
(and our) claims in the litigation, which
by the Supreme Court for the extraordinary
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
evidence they placed in the recordpermitted, following the district court's
evidence that, in part, made the Court's
initial denial of their motion to intervene.
ruling possible given its composition-the
The student intervenors included Michigan
spirit of their arguments seems to have
SALT Equalizer
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found its way into the majority and
concurring opinions.
Indeed, as is probably true for many of
us, when I first picked up Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter, I
had braced myself for disappointing
equivocality, but found myself pleasantly
surprised. Although there is certainly room
for critique of the opinion and, more
broadly, the way in which the "liberal
defense of affirmative action" 5 dominated
Michigan's arguments and those of many
of its supporters, I was struck by sentences
in the opinion such as: "Context matters
when reviewing race-based governmental
action under the Equal Protection
Clause . .. . Not every decision influenced
by race is equally objectionable and strict
scrutiny is designed to provide a framework
for carefully examining the importance
and sincerity of the reasons advanced by
the governmental decisionmaker for the
use of race in that particular context. "6
Could it be that this really was an
O'Connor opinion? Had she at last gained
some sense and reason in matters relating
to affirmative action? As I read on, it
appeared that she had, at least in part.
In distinguishing this case from her
other (disastrous) affirmative action
opinions, for example, O'Connor had
taken to heart the "important purpose of
public education and the expansive
freedoms of speech and thought associated
with the university environment," the
public university's "special niche in our
constitutional tradition," and the real
significance of a public university's First
Amendment right to "educational
autonomy. "7 It was a relief to know that
the Court seemed to understand what
academic freedom is actually about: a
university's freedom to make its own
decisions concerning its goals, programs,
and "the selection of its student body." 8
Emphasizing this special educational
context.Justice O'Connor, joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, resolved the controversial issue left
August 2003
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open in Bakke of whether diversity is a
compelling state interest in the context of
public higher education by holding
resoundingly that it is. 9 Subsequently, the
Court upheld the Law School's admissions
policy-which is based on the assemblage
of a diverse student body that includes a
"critical mass" of students of color-as
being narrowly tailored to serve this
compelling state interest, and rejected Ms.
Grutter's argument that the Law School's
use of the "critical mass" concept
constituted a functional quota.10 In so
doing, O'Connor considered the "real" and
"substantial" educational benefits flowing
from a diverse student body. She noted in
particular that:
T] he Law School's admissions policy
promotes "cross-racial understanding," helps to break down racial
stereotypes, and "enables [students] to
better understand persons of different
races." ...
[N] umerous studies show that
student body diversity promotes
learning outcomes, and "better
prepares students for an increasingly
diverse workforce and society, and
better prepares them as professionals."
These benefits are not theoretical
but real, as major American businesses have made clear that the skills
needed in today's increasingly global
marketplace can only be developed
through exposure to widely diverse
people, culture, ideas, and viewpoints.
This court has long recognized that
"education ... is the very foundation
of good citizenship." For this reason,
the diffusion of knowledge and
opportunity through public institutions of higher education must be
accessible to all individuals regardless
of race or ethnicity.... Effective
participation by members of all racial
and ethnic groups in the civic life of
our Nation is essential if the dream of

SALT Equalizer

one Nation, indivisible, is to be
realized.
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger
Moreover, universities, and in
particular, law schools, represent the
training ground for a large number of
our Nation's leaders .... In order to
mass admissions policy can be seen as
cultivate a set of leaders with
anti-essentialism theory in practice.
legitimacy in the eyes of the citizenry,
Although this was something that Ms.
it is necessary that the path to
Grutter's lawyers and the district court
leadership be visibly opened to
never quite got a handle on, O'Connor
talented and qualified individuals of
understood the fundamentals of antievery race and ethnicity. All members
essentialism (though not to a radical
of our heterogeneous society must
extent), even if she did not use the
have confidence in the openness and
language of critical race feminists:
integrity of the educational instituThe Law School does not premise its
11
tions that provide this training.
need for critical mass on "any belief
While this language is astonishing in
that minority students always (or even
some ways, it is not in others. The Court,
consistently) express some characterisfor example, failed to acknowledge the
tic minority viewpoint on any issue."
"not theoretical but real" disparities
To the contrary, diminishing the force
between whites and people of color in
of such stereotypes is both a crucial
their/our "effective participation ... in
part of the Law School's mission, and
civic life," which disparities are reflected
one that it cannot accomplish with
most significantly in the socioeconomic
only token numbers of minority
and political disempowerment and
students. Just as growing up in a
disenfranchisement of communities of
particular region or having particular
color in the United States. Moreover,
professional experiences is likely to
O'Connor's reference to the United States'
affect an individual's views, so too is
economic success in the global marketone's own, unique experience of being
place and that success's dependence on
a racial minority in a society, like our
diversity (arguments that were made in the
own, in which race unfortunately still
amicus brief filed in support of the Law
matters....
School by General Motors and other large,
[T] he Law School engages in a
12
likeminded corporations ) stirs some
highly individualized, holistic review
feelings of unease. 13 While the economic
of each applicant's file, giving serious
and business justifications for diversity
consideration to all the ways an
might be compelling to many, justificaapplicant might contribute to a
tions more firmly and explicitly rooted in
diverse educational environment. The
principles embodied by notions of
Law School affords this individualized
substantive equality and anti-subordinaconsideration to applicants of all
races.14
tion struggle would have been even more
so.
Michigan's reliance on the critical
And what are we to make of the Court's
mass concept was well placed not only
ruling that the Law School's policy of
because it won O'Connor's swing vote, but
admitting and enrolling a "critical mass"
also because it compelled the Court to
of students of color is a narrowly tailored
concede that in our society today, race still
means by which to achieve the compelling
state interest of diversity? On the one hand,
Reflections continued on page 10
Michigan's implementation of the critical

Page 9

August 2003

www.saltlaw.org
twenty-five, particularly given how
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger slowly we have progressed in the
twenty-five years since Bakke.
* * *
Ironically, even though MichiganReflections:
with the support of scores of other law
schools, colleges, and universities 17-fought
continuedfrom page 9
and won (for now) the good fight to
matters.
preserve affirmative action in the context
On the other hand, the "critical mass"
of admissions, it appears that neither the
concept did not compel the Court (for it
Law School nor most of its peer instituwas not designed for this purpose) to
tions have been quite as committed to that
reconsider in any meaningful way its neofight in the context offaculty hiring ...
conservative dream of the "colorblind
but that is a topic for another time and
society." 15 Just as troubling are the
forum. Other affirmative action battles
presumptions underlying the critical mass
continue to loom large before us. In the
concept that minority students are
wake of Grutter, for example, University of
valuable first and foremost for the
California Regent Ward Connerly has
educational benefits they will confer on
"joked" (and thus, we should take him
their majority classmates, and that they
quite seriously) that he will bring his antihave an obligation to confer those benefits
affirmative action ballot initiative to
in the first place. While it is true that all
Michigan and other states, and our
of us benefit from the breaking down of
opponents have already committed
stereotypes, students of color are far more
themselves to bringing new challenges to
susceptible to being typed in specific and
affirmative action policies that do comply
particularly negative ways by their peers,
with Grutter. On an even more potentially
teachers, and potential employers than are
devastating front, Connerly is also behind
majority students; consequently, they must
Proposition 54 in California, which
do more to "diminish the force of such
proposes a state constitutional amendstereotypes" than their majority counterment, officially titled the Classification by
parts. Analogously, and for a long time
Race, Ethnicity, Color, or National Origin
now, feminists of color engaged in largely
initiative (also known as, in the clever
white feminist movements have expressed
rhetoric of its proponents, the Racial
their/our frustration over having to
Privacy Initiative), which would bar state
educate white feminists about race, as well
and local agencies from collecting,
as over the expectation that they/we will do
compiling, or using information about
so. Is this analogous burden in the law
race and ethnicity. 18 We can well imagine
school context a fair one to place on
the nightmarish consequences of such an
students of color, whether or not they are
initiative passing in California, 19 where so
part of a critical mass? And how will the
many conservative movements seem to
critical mass theory of admissions affect
find their legs before going national. And
the future of affirmative action in the
then, of course, there is global war and
educational context? Will we ever be able
occupation, which I cannot even begin to
to get beyond the critical mass, assuming
discuss in this commentary, for fear of
that we want to? The Court says that we
trivializing and oversimplifying the
have twenty-five years to figure that out.
devastating and far-reaching effects of
Although, according to Supreme Court
what may tum into a new era of American
jurisprudence, affirmative action programs
imperialism. Here, I simply echo Mari
are to be temporary remedies, 16 it is not
Matsuda's call to make the linkages-in
clear why O'Connor chose the number
SALT Equalizer
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our teaching, writing, practice, and
activism-between war, occupation, and
our domestic civil rights struggles. All of
this gloom and doom and the accompanying call for perseverance is not to say that
we should not continue to feel and express
exuberance over the victory won in Grutter,
but as we do so, we must be sure to re-fuel
for the many battles to come and plan for
a time when we can finally go on the
offensive.
Endnotes:
1. This cohort included several
classmates who went on to become law
professors, such as Guy Uriel-Charles of the
University of Minnesota, Jeannine Bell of
Indiana University-Bloomington, and Luis
Fuentes-Rowher, also of IV-Bloomington.
2• Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265 (1978).
3. The SALT amicus brief can be
accessed on the SALT website at http://
saltlaw.org/gruttersaltbrief.pdf, or on the
University of Michigan website at http://
www.umich.edu/-urel/admissions/legal/
gru_amicus-ussc/um/SALT-gru.pdf.
4. Grutter v. Bollinger,_ U.S. _,
123 S. Ct. 2325, 2348 (2003) (Ginsburg,].,
concurring) (citing to statistics relating to
educational segregation and stating:
"[S]chools in predominantly minority
communities lag far behind others
measured by the educational resources
available to them. However strong the
public's desire for improved education
systems may be, it remains the current
reality that many minority students
encounter markedly inadequate and
unequal educational opportunities."
(citations omitted)).
5. Charles R. Lawrence III, Two Views
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal
Defense ofAffirmative Action, 101 CowM.
L. REV. 928 (2001).
6. Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338 (citations
omitted) .
7. Id at 2339.
8. Id
9. "Today, we hold that the Law School
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has a compelling state interest in attaining a diverse student body." Id
10• Id at 2343.
11 . Id at 2339-41.
12· Alink to the amicus brief filed by
GM, et al., in support of the Law School
can be accessed athttp://www.umich.edu/
-ureVadmissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/
um/GM-both.pdf.
13 · Thanks to Neil Gotandafor his
insightful observations concerning this
point, which were posted during a lively
discussion of the Grutter case that took
place on the AALS Minority Lawprofs
Listserv shortly after the Court had issued
its decision.
14• Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2341, 2343.
15• Id at 2350-65 (Thomas,].,
dissenting); see, e.g., City of Richmond v.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 520-28 (1989)
(Scalia,]., concurring).
16. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,
510 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); United
States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 171 (1987).
17. For a complete listing of and links
to amicus briefs filed in support of the
Law School in the Grutter case, including
several briefs filed on behalf of no fewer
than 60 colleges, universities, and law
schools, see http://www.umich.edu/-ureV
admissions/legal/gru_amicus-ussc/
um.html.
info
. on Proposi. 1s·For more irnormat1on
tion 54, see the Coalition for an Informed
California website (http://
www.informedcalifornia.org/facts.shtml)
and the Californians for Justice Education
Fundwebsite (http://www.caljustice.org/
issues_elections.shtml).
19· For example, according to the
Californians for Justice Education Fund
'
passage of CRECNO will "[[e] ndanger the
health and safety of all communities;
[h] amper . .. efforts to fight the spreadof
disease; [u] ndermine school reform and
educational equity; [and] [a]llow racial
profiling to continue." http://
www.caljustice.org/issues_elections.shtml.
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Jam Tomorrow:
continuedfrom page 7

Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger

ongoing struggle for inclusion throughout
American society, including in institutions
of higher learning.
Nevertheless, there are questions and
areas of concern raised by the Court's
opinion which may impact the future of
affirmative action and the goal to end
racism in American society. These areas are
discussed below.
1. First, as an overarching matter, the

Court limited the debate on affirmative
action to the diversity rationale. This is
understandable, of course, as this was the
sole basis upon which the University of
Michigan justified its admissions
programs. The University based its defense
on the prerogative of colleges and universities to determine the manner in which the
educational mission was accomplished.
The exercise of this prerogative included
admissions decisions designed to achieve a
highly qualified and diverse student body
population for the individual and
collective educational enterprise.Justice
O'Connor accepted this rationale without
reservation, and found no contradiction
between the University's goal of academic
excellence and racial and ethnic diversity.
She stated," [T]he Law School's raceconscious admissions program adequately
ensures that all factors that maycontribute to student body diversity are meaningfully considered alongside race in admissions decisions. With respect to the use of
race itself, all underrepresented minority
students admitted by the Law School have
been deemed qualified."
Yet, by giving scant attention to the
social inequities that generate the need for
affirmative action programs in the first
instance, the Court virtually absolves
governmental and other societal institutions of the responsibility to eradicate
racial and economic injustice at the heart
Page 11

of disparate and discriminatory treatment
in education and throughout American
society in a systematic way.Justice
O'Connor's recognition of these underlying
issues is bnef. Finding that a "critical
mass" of students of color is not tantamount to a quota system, she notes in
Grutter:
[D] iminishing the force of such
stereotypes is both a crucial part of the
Law School's mission, and one that it
cannot accomplish with only token
numbers of minority students. Just as
growing up in a particular region or
having particular professional
experiences is likely to affect an
individual's views, so too is one's own,
unique experience of being a racial
minority in a society, like our own, in
which race unfortunatelystill
matters.
She also observes that racial inequality
mayaccount for disparate educational and
societal experiences between students of
color and white students, noting that
"[B]y virtue of our Nation's struggle with
racial inequality, [minority students] are
both likely to have experiences of particular importance to the Law School's
mission, and less likely to be admitted in
meaningful numbers on criteria that
ignore those experiences." However, as the
amicus brief filed by the Society of
American LLaw Teachers (and briefs filed by
mtervenors on behalf of students of color)
argued, such racial justice concerns
warranted.fuller direct attention by the
Court. As SALT demonstrated in our brief
deliberate governmental policies in the '
State of Michigan led to residential
segregation, discrimination in primary,
secondary and higher education, and
fam 1bmorrow continued on page 12
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The general absence of the
,,
discrimination claims in the Court's
Commentary on Grutter v. Boldnger opinion helps to further embed factors
such as geographical and residential
location, status as offspring of alumni,
Jam Tomorrow:
racially segregated and under-resourced
secondary schools, availability (or lack
continuedfrom page 11
thereof) of advanced placement courses,
employment discrimination. In addition,
and over-reliance on standardized testing,
the University's reliance on the LSAT, with
as non-neutral racially disparate determiits cultural, gender, and economic biases,
nants of admission to institutions of
had a disparate impact on minority
higher learning. Inevitably, these issues
students seeking admission to the state
will be raised in future considerations of
university. For these reasons, SALT urged
affirmative action, so long as disproporthe Court to incorporate these salient
tionate poverty levels within Native
arguments regarding racial disparity and
American, Latina/o, African-American, and
injustice into its decision.
several Asian-American communities
In large measure, such concerns were
persist. For instance, the Children's Defense
ignored, with the notable exception of
Fund (CDF) recently reported that "the
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion.
number of extremely poor black children is
Where Justice O'Connor is indirect, Justice
now at its highest level in the 23 years for
Ginsburg is straightforward:
which such data exist." CDF also noted
It is well documented that conscious
that extreme poverty has deepened since
and unconscious race bias, even rank
the implementation of welfare to work
discrimination based on race, remain
requirements enacted in 1996 and that
alive in our land, impeding realiza"fewer and fewer otherwise extremely poor
tion of our highest values and
children of all races receive cash public
ideals.. .. As to public education, data
assistance.Agrowing number have no
for the years 2000-2001 show that
assistance, despite their extreme poverty."
71.6% of African-American children
Obviously, high poverty rates within
and 76.3% of Hispanic children
communities of color will have a deleteriattended a school in which minorities
ous impact on learning opportunities at
made up a majority of the student
all educational levels. While the Court
body.. . .And schools in predomideclined to formally address racial
nantly minority communities lag far
discrimination claims in Grutter and
behind others measured by the
Gratz, these disparities remain at the heart
educational resources available to
of why affirmative action is necessary, and
them. However strong the public's
why diverse racial and ethnic perspectives
desire for improved education systems
are key to understanding, shaping and
may be, it remains the current reality
implementing American law and policy.
that many minority students
encounter markedly inadequate and
2. Another area of concern lies in the
unequal educational opportunities.
primary basis for the split opinions in
Despite these inequalities, some
Grutter and Gratz, namely the constituminority students are able to meet the
tionality of the specific admissions policies
high threshold requirements set for
in the law school and the undergraduate
admission to the country's finest
program. By a 5-4 margin, the Court
undergraduate and graduate educadetermined that the admissions policy by
tional institutions.
the University of Michigan Law School,
SALT Equalizer
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which considers race and ethnicity in a
nuanced manner, was constitutionally
acceptable. As such, race-consciousness is
permissible as long as it is conducted in a
holistic, nuanced manner, in which the
qualifications and attributes of each
applicant is compared against those of
other individual applicants. However, by a
6-3 margin, with Justice O'Connor joining
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion, the Court found that the
University of Michigan undergraduate
program's 150 point system, in which 20
points were assigned to minority applicants, was not narrowly tailored and
thereby violated the Equal Protection
Clause. In this regard, the Court found that
the undergraduate policy placed too much
emphasis on race in an inflexible,
determinative way.
Upon closer consideration, however, it
is difficult to find a convincing basis for
the Court's distinction between the
program upheld in the law school, and
that struck down in the undergraduate
program. Hence the distinction between a
policy that is constitutionally acceptable
and that which is not seems to be the
difference between the oblique and the
obvious consideration of race in university
admissions. As Justices Souter and
Ginsburg noted in separate dissents in
Gratz, the undergraduate program
contained an objective scale that adhered
to the racial "plus factor" system that
Justice Powell approved in Bakke. By
assigning a range of point values to several
hard and soft admissions criteria, individual assessments of candidates was
conducted and admission was not
guaranteed on the basis of race. Thus, it is
ironic that the Court rejected the point
system in Gratz, as the University sought
an objective and flexible approach to the
admissions decision.
What is particularly troubling about
the Court's distinction, however, is the
preference for vague consideration of race
in admissions, when the Court has
August 2003
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acknowledged the significance of race in
American life and educational opportunity. The Court's disapproval of the
undergraduate program's clear approach to
considering race and other relevant
attributes in the admissions decision will
make it more difficult to deal with race
and racial disparity forthrightly. In
contrast, in upholding the law school's
policy, the Court perpetuates the minimization and obscure consideration of race
and ethnicity in areas where it matters
most. This lack of transparency in dealing
with racial issues seems to reflect the
American public's continual denial of the
salience of such matters. Thus, while
public opinion polls by Pew, Cornell
University and others reveal that a
substantial majority of the American
public supports affirmative action in
theory, many (primarilywhites) oppose
specific programs that would ensure its
effectiveness.
For this reason, the Court's opinion in
Grutter, while a victory for the recognition
of racial and ethnic diversity in higher
education, may have the counterproductive
effect of upholding the principle of
affirmative action while allowing only
minimal consideration of race and
ethnicity in university admissions. This
unfortunate result would serve to further
inculcate the underlying racial discrimination that makes affirmative action
necessary, especially for the lack of
attention to matters of race.

3. In light of the Court's reluctance to
expressly acknowledge the persistence of
racism and inequity in American social
institutions, perhaps the most troubling
aspect of the Court's decision in Grutter is
Justice O'Connor's ostensible establishment of an endpoint for affirmative action
in twenty-five years. She stated in the
opinion, "We expect that 25years from
now the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest
approved today." In a subsequent interview
SALT Equalizer

in the Chicago Tribune, Justice
O'Connor clarified that her mention of
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger
the twenty-five year period was an
expression of hope, not a firm deadline.
However, opponents of affirmative action
have seized upon this time-frame as a
racial identity as an African-American and
constitutional line in the sand.
his discomfort with having benefitted
Justice O'Connor's expressed desire for
from affirmative action as the starting
an end to affirmative action within a
point for his dissenting opinion.
generation is consistent with her philosoFor purposes of arguing against racephy of color-blind constitutional analysis
based affirmative action,Justice Thomas
and her wish for a nation in which racial
quotes Frederick Douglass, speaking to
and ethnic distinctions no longer exist. As
abolitionists on January 1, 1865:
her previous opinions on affirmative
[I] n regard to the colored people,
action and voting rights indicate, she views
there is always more that is benevocontinued recognition of race and
lent, I perceive than just, manifested
ethnicity in law as not per se impermistowards us. What I ask for the negro is
sible, but as divisive forces in American
not benevolence, not pity, not
society. The erasure of racial, ethnic, and
sympathy, but simplyjustice. The
cultural uniqueness is a peculiar aspiraAmerican people have always been
tion, in my view, and one that ultimately
anxious to know what theyshall do
would deprive the nation of the strength,
with us . ... I have but one answer
acumen, creativity, and resourcefulness of
from the beginning. Do nothing with
people from diverse backgrounds who are
us! If the apples will not remain on
Americans. Thus, I believe that Justice
the tree of their own strength, if they
O'Connor's insistence on a color-blind
are worm-eaten at the core, if they are
society is not constitutionally required, nor
early ripe and disposed to fall, let
socially desirable.
them fall! ... And if the negro cannot
stand on his own legs, let him fall
4. While advocating a color-blind
also. All I ask is, give him a chance to
society,Justice O'Connor nevertheless
stand on his own legs! Let him alone!
retains a degree of realism upon recogniz[Y] our interference is doing him
ing the significance of race and ethnicity
positive injury.
in American society and by extension in
This quote, while representative of
constitutional analysis. However, her
Frederick Douglass's views, is quickly
conservative brethren on the Court would
revealed as disingenuous as used byJustice
reject any attention to race by government
Thomas upon recognizing that Douglass's
as wholly impermissible and violative of
hopes for African-Americans in U.S. society
the Fourteenth Amendment. In this regard,
did not materialize. When Frederick
Justice Thomas's dissent in Grutter
Douglass called upon the U.S. government
warrants particular discussion.Justices
to "leave the negro alone," he spoke two
O'Connor and Thomas share the belief in
years after the Emancipation Proclamaa color-blind America, albeit from
tion of]anuary 1, 1863: His was an appeal
different vantage points. Justice O'Connor
for fairness, enfranchisement, and full
believes attention to race to be detrimental
citizenship for African-Americans. But the
to the nation, whereas Justice Thomas
Nation did not "leave the negro alone."
believes attention to be detrimental to the
Hence, events before and after the incepputative beneficiary of beneficial racial
Jam Tomorrow continued on page I 4
programs. Justice Thomas invokes his
Page 13
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every tum of the road. If he comes
Commentary on Grutter v. Bollinger in rags and wretchedness, he answers
the public demand for a negro, and
provokes no anger, though he may
provoke derision, but if he presumes
Jam Tomorrow:
to be a gentleman and a scholar, he is
then
entirely out of his place. He
continuedfrom page 13
excites resentment and calls forth
stem
and bitter opposition. If he offers
tion of the nation, including slavery,
himself to a builder as a mechanic, to
segregation, Jim Crow, Black Codes,
a client as a lawyer, to a patient as a
terrorist marauders, disenfranchisement,
physician, to a university as a
land dispossession, and discrimination in
professor,
or to a department as a
education and employment, relegated
clerk, no matter what may be his
African-Americans to slavery and nearability or his attainments, there is a
slavery conditions after the Civil War. So
presumption, based upon his color or
steeped was the nation in racist ideology of
his
previous condition, of incompeAnglo-American superiority andAfricantency, and if he succeeds at all, he had
American inferiority that Black soldiers
to do so against this most discouragwere not pennitted to serve in the Union
ing presumption.
forces in the struggle for their own
It is a real calamity, in this country,
emancipation, and as confederate forces
for any man, guilty or not guilty, to
pressed Blacks into service as military slave
be accused of crime, but it is an
laborers. When Lincoln finally relented,
incomparably greater calamity for
due in large measure to Douglass's
any colored man to be so accused.
entreaties, Black soldiers served gallantly,
Justice is often painted with bandaged
under worse conditions and with less pay
eyes. She is described in forensic
than their white counterparts.
eloquence, as utterly blind to wealth
Thus, while Douglass tirelessly
or poverty, high or low, white or black;
advocated for racial equality, his speech on
but a mask of iron, however thick,
April 16, 1883, twenty years after the
could
never blind American justice,
Emancipation Proclamation, expressed his
when a black man happens to be on
disappointment at the lack of rights
trial. Here, even more than elsewhere,
accorded to Black citizens, and bears
he will find all presumptions of law
excerpting at length:
and evidence against him. It is not so
Let any man now claim for the
much the business of his enemies to
negro, or, worse still, let the negro now
prove
him guilty, as it is the business
claim for himself, any right,
of himself to prove his innocence.
privilege, or immunity which has
Despite his recognition that the nation
hitherto been denied by law or
had not "left the negro alone," Douglass
custom, and he will at once open a
remained confident in the ability of
fountain of bitterness, and call forth
Americans and the U.S. government to be
overwhelming wrath.
fair. Yet at the Republican convention of
It is his sad lot to live in a land
1876, he asked, "Do you mean to make
where all presumptions are arrayed
good
to us the promises of your constituagainst him, unless we accept the
tion?" The fulfillment of the promises of
presumption of inferiority and
fairness
and full citizenship bespeaks the
worthlessness. If his course is downcontinuing need for affinnative action.
ward, he meets very little resistance,
but if upward, his way is disputed at
SALT Equalizer
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5. In the short and long run, communities of color also prefer an end to the
need for affinnative action. They recognize, however, that affinnative action will
no longer be necessary once the entrenched
structural inequalities in educational
opportunity for children of color cease to
exist. Appreciating these preconditions,
fonner Republican Congressman Jack
Kemp recently called "shortsighted" his
fellow conservatives' efforts to continue to
oppose affinnative action after the Court's
decision. According to Kemp, "While I
agree that ultimately a color-blind society
should be our goal, we certainly are not
there yet. Blacks were removed from the
mainstream economy, denied access to
education, job opportunities and access to
capital and ownership. Thus, AfricanAmericans have long been denied their full
measure of justice under the law, and
while great progress has been made, we
have a long way to go."
Next year, the nation will commemorate the landmark Supreme Court decision
in Brown v. Board ofEducation (1954).
In Brown, a unanimous Supreme Court
declared racial segregation in primary and
secondary public schools to be inherently
unequal, and thereby unconstitutional. We
need only acknowledge our national
shortcomings in realizing the promise of
Brown fifty years later as we contemplate
the implications of]ustice O'Connor's
suggested time limitation for affinnative
action in twenty-five years. Indeed, the
Harvard Civil Rights Project has revealed
that racial segregation in K-12 schools is
greater than it was thirty years ago. HCRP
attributes this retrogressive phenomenon to
white flight, increases in enrollment by
Black, Latino, and Asian students, racially
segregated housing patterns and other
fonns of housing discrimination, and the
tennination of court-ordered desegregation
decrees.
Surely, all agree with Justice O'Connor
that "[a]ccess to legal education (and thus
the legal profession) must be inclusive of
August2003
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talented and qualified individuals of every
race and ethnicity, so that all members of
our heterogeneous society may participate
in the educational institutions that
provide the training and education
necessary to succeed in America." However,
if higher education is to remain accessible
to all so that the benefits of equality and
diversity are achieved, affirmative action
cannot be terminated by arbitrary datesetting. Justice Ginsburg best expressed this
reality in her clear-eyed concurrence in
Grutter, stating: "[F] rom today's vantage
point, one may hope, but not firmly
forecast, that over the next generation's
span, progress toward nondiscrimination
and genuinely equal opportunity will
make it safe to sunset affirmative action."
About an earlier era, historian Eric
Foner has written, "From the enforcement
of the rights of citizens to the stubborn
problems of economic and racial justice,
the issues central to Reconstruction are as
old as the American republic, and as
contemporary as the inequities that still
afflict our society." Apropos the current
discussion, unless and until the nation
demonstrates the will and commits the
necessary resources to end racial inequity
and injustice, affirmative action will
remain necessary. In the absence of such
commitment, yesterday will look very
much like today, and today will look very
much like tomorrow - jam yesterday,
jam tomorrow. The Supreme Court's
decision in Grutter, in which it recognizes
the signal value of diversity in educational
and national institutions, provides the
American public a powerful incentive to
make the promises of democracy a reality
for all citizens.
Endnotes:
1. Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking
Glass.
2• This commentary originally
appeared in the Jurist, an online legal
journal. In the version of the essay printed
here, footnotes and citations have been
omitted.
SALT Equalizer

Supreme Court Roundup
Alicia Alvarez, DePaul University College of Law

The Supreme Court decided a number of significant cases this term in addition to Grutter
and.Lawrence. (See pages 2-14 for reaction to those decisions.)
In Demore v. Kim, the Court ruled that mandatory detention of a legal permanent
resident during deportation proceedings is a constitutionally valid aspect of the process, even
where there has been no finding that the alien is unlikely to appear for deportation proceedings. Section 1226(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which requires detention
pending a removal proceeding for aliens convicted of certain crimes, does not violate due
process, the Court determined. On a positive note, the Court found that Section 1226(e) does
not deprive the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant habeas relief. The Court distinguished
Zadvydas, which it decided in 2001.
In a troubling voting rights decision, Georgia v. Ashcroft, the Court ruled on Georgia's
State Senate districting plan. The majority (Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy
and Thomas) reversed and remanded the District Court's finding that the plan violated
Section 5of the Voting Rights Act and was therefore not entitled to preclearance. The Court
found that the District Court did not consider all relevant factors when it examined whether
the plan resulted in the retrogression of black voters' effective exercise of the electoral
franchise. The diminution of a minority group's effective exercise of the electoral franchise
violates Section 5 only if the state cannot show that the gains in the plan as a whole offset
the loss in particular districts, the Court said. The courts must consider "all relevant circumstances" including the minority voters' ability to elect their candidate of choice (an important but not a dispositive or exclusive factor), the extent of the minority group's opportunity
to participate in the political process (including "influence" districts), and the feasibility of
creating a nonretrogressive plan. The Court found that Section 5 gives states flexibility,
allowing them to risk having fewer minority representatives in order to achieve greater overall
representation of a minority group by increasing the number of representatives sympathetic
to the interests of minority groups. The District Court focused too narrowly on three districts,
the Court decided, and improperly rejected evidence that the legislators representing the
majority-minority districts supported the plan and that the state decided that the best way to
maximize black voting strength was to unpack the high concentration of minority voters in
the majority-minority districts.
The Court ruled in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington that interest on
lawyers' trust accounts (IOLTA) programs do not involve a regulatory taking. Alaw requiring
that the interest on those funds be transferred to a different owner for a legitimate public use
could be aper se taking requiring the payment of "just compensation." However, because just
compensation is measured by the owner's pecuniary loss, which was zero in this case, the
Court held that there was no violation of the just compensation clause.
The Court remanded Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians ofthe Bishop Community ofthe Bishop Colony, a case dealing with tribal sovereignty and state jurisdiction. The
Bishop Paiute Tribe in California filed an action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to
establish that state law was preempted to the extent that it puiported to authorize seizure of
tribal records. The Tribe sought relief under Section 1983, alleging that the District Attorney's
office had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when it obtained and executed a
search warrant for some of the Tribe's Gaming Coiporation's employment records. The Court
found that the Tribe cannot sue under Section 1983 since it is not a "person" or "citizen." It
remanded for consideration of the jurisdictional question of whether any prescription of
federal common law enables the Tribe to maintain an action for injunctive and declaratory
relief establishing its sovereign right to be free from state criminal processes.
Supreme Court continued on page 16
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continued/rampage 15

In United States v. American Library
Association, the Court upheld the Children's
Internet Protection Act, which forbids public
libraries from receiving federal assistance for
Internet access unless they install software to
block obscene or pornographic images and
prevent minors from accessing material
hannful to them. The Court found the Act
does not violate the patrons' First Amendment rights, and is a valid exercise of
Congress' spending power. TheActdoesnot
impose an unconstitutional condition on
libraries, the Court determined, and Internet
access in public libraries is not a public
forum. Further, the Court found, any
concerns about constitutional difficulties
posed by the erroneous blocking of innocuous sites were dispelled by the ease with
which library patrons can request that
filtering software be disabled.
Scheidler v. NOWwas a class action
lawsuit alleging that the defendants,
individuals and organizations that oppose
legal abortion, had violated RICO by for
engaging in a nationwide conspiracy to shut
down abortion clinics through a pattern of
racketeering activities that included
extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act. The
jury found in favor of the plaintiffs and
awarded damages; the District Court entered
a nationwide injunction. The Supreme
Court reversed, finding that the defendants
had not committed extortion within the
meaning of the Hobbs Act because they did
not "obtain" property from the plaintiffs.
While the defendants' activities deprived the
plaintiffs of their ability to exercise their
property right to legal abortions, said the
Court, that deprivation did not constitute
extortion within the meaning of the Hobbs
Act since extortion requires both deprivation
and acquisitionof property. The defendants
did not receive something of value that they
could exercise,transfer or sell.
Among the many cases in the criminal
law area, the Court ruled in a favor of a
capital murder defendant who brought an
SALT Equalizer

ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
Writing for the majority in Wiggins v.
Smith, Justice O'Connor found that trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance
by failing to investigate and present
mitigating evidence of the defendant's
dysfunctional background, including severe
physical and sexual abuse he had suffered at
the hands of his mother and in foster care.
The decision not to expand the investigation
beyond the presenting investigation report
and the City Department of Social Services
records fell short of prevailing professional
standards, which included the preparation
of a social history report. The Court found a
reasonable probability that a jury confronted with evidence of the defendant's
alcoholic absentee mother, physical
torment, sexual molestation, repeated rapes
while in foster care, homelessness, and
diminished mental capacity would have
returned a different verdict, especially since
he had no prior convictions.
Justice Scalia, joined by Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas, found in
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania no doublejeopardy bar to the state seeking the death
penalty on retrial when the defendant had
been sentenced to life imprisonment in the
first trial. Under Pennsylvania law, the
verdict in the penalty phase of capital
proceedings must be death if the jury
unanimously finds at least one aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, or one or more aggravating
circumstances outweighing any mitigating
circumstances, but it must be life imprisonment in all other instances. The court may
discharge a jury if it determines that the
jury will not unanimously agree on the
sentence, but the court must then enter a
life sentence.The defendant was sentenced
to life after the judge discharged the jurors
when they reported that they were deadlocked 9-3 for life imprisonment. On
appeal, the court reversed the murder
conviction and remanded for a new trial. At
thesecond trial, the jury imposed a death
sentence. The Court found that the double
jeopardy clause applies to capital sentencing
proceedings that "have the hallmarks of the
Page 16

trial on guilt or innocence." However it said
the relevant inquiry here was whether' life '
sentence in the first trial was an "acquittal"
that was based on findings that the
defendant was legally entitled to a life
sentence because the government had failed
to prove one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a re
reasonable doubt. The Court
said that the life sentence was not an
"acquittal" because the jury in the first trial
deadlocked without making any findings
with respect to the alleged aggravating
circumstances, and because the judge had no
discretion to do anything but enter a life
sentence after the jury deadlocked.
In Overton v. Bazzetta, an opinion
with no dissents, the Court found that
Michigan's restrictions on prison visits did
not violate the First, Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments. The state's Department of
Corrections allows inmates to receive visits
only from qualified clergy, attorneys on
business, and persons placed on an approved
list, which may include an unlimited
number of immediate family members and
ten others. Aminor child may visit only ifs/
he is the child, stepchild, grandchild or
sibling of the inmate, and is accompanied
by a family member of the child or inmate,
or by the child's legal guardian. No former
prisoner may visit unless s/he is an immediate family member of the inmate and the
warden approves. Prisoners who commit two
substance abuse violations may receive only
clergy and attorneys, but may apply for
reinstatement of privileges after two years.
The Court held that these regulations satisfy
the four factors used to decide whether a
prison regulation affecting a constitutional
right that survives incarceration withstands
constitutional challenge: First, it found, the
regulations bear a rational relationship to
legitimate penological interest. Second, the
inmates have alternative means of exercising
their asserted right of association (letters and
telephone). Third, accommodating the right
would have a considerable impact on the
guards, other inmates, prison resources and
the safety of other prisoners. Finally, all
alternatives have a more than de minimus
cost.
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Nancy and Paula's Excellent Adventure:
The First Running of the Princess Cycling Tour
SALT Co-President Paula C. Johnson, Syracuse University College of Law,
and Nancy K. Ota, Albany Law School

I've got a mule, her name is Sal,
Fifteen years on the Erie Canal.
She's a good ol' worker and a good ol' pal,
Fifteen years on the Erie Canal.
We've hauled some barges in our day,
Filled with lumber, coal, and hay,
And ev 'ry inch of the way we know
From Albany to Buffalo
- The Erie Canal Song
On Sunday, July 13, the Princess TourPaulaJohnson, Nancy Ota, Laura Shore,
and Delores Walters-breezed under the
green and white balloon arch signaling the
completion of the summer 2003 bike ride
along the Erie Canal Towpath. We had
completed the week-long 400-mile tour
from Buffalo to Albany, NY, tested our
physical endurance, enjoyed hours of
laughter, and helped raise money to
support SALT's justice work. Not bad for eight days! Come along, and we'll tell you the story
of our adventure.

How we got started
With Albany and Syracuse located just a couple of hours from each other on the New York
State Thruway, we (Nancy and Paula) frequently talked about getting together just for fun.
We also talked about our interest in cycling, and how we should explore our local parts of the
Erie Canal Towpath bike trail when we visited each other. We hadn't been very successful at
getting together apart from law school or conference functions, though, until this summer.
Thus, last spring, we became very excited when we saw the announcement for the Fifth
Annual Bike Ride Across New York, a 400-mile, eight-day bicycle tour from Buffalo to Albany,
New York, along the historic Erie Canal. Eureka! We jumped at the chance and got our
partners Laura and Delores involved, too. We all signed onto the ride as soon as they began
taking names.
Never leaving our social justice instincts far behind, we also thought there must be some
way that our physical prowess also could benefit SALT. As SALT's newest and most ambitious
public interest effort, we decided to lend our bodies to raise money for the Norman Dorsen
Fund. We thought that enthusiastic (and sympathetic!) SALT members would pledge
contributions to support us on the ride and to help the Dorsen Fund. We were correct on both
counts, as many SALT members gave us warm send-offs and many others pledged amounts
for the Dorsen Fund as we set out to complete the 400 mile trek.
Cycling continued on page 18

SALT Equalizer

Page 17

August2003

www.saltlaw.org

Cycling:
continuedfrom page 17

SALT Co-President Michael Rooke-Ley,
Dorsen Fund chairperson Sylvia Law, and
Sylvia's assistant Leslie Jenkins took care of
the pledge drive. The four of us simply had
to take care of trip logistics and getting our
bodies ready for the ride. Easy. Well,
maybe not so easy. Our schedules were
hectic, and winter seemed to hang on
forever and spring was cooler than usual,
so it was difficult to take training rides
consistently. But we were determined and
stayed in contact with each other by phone
or e-mail to see how we were doing with
training. When the weather finally turned
warm enough, we were off the stationary
bikes and riding outside several times a
week. Close to the tour date we cycled 50
miles in a day, which was the average daily
mileage during the trip. We were on our
way!
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The tour was very well organized. It
was sponsored by the New York Parks and
Conservation Association (NYPCA), the
New York State Canal Corporation, and
several corporate contributors. It included
breakfasts, dinners, daily refreshment stops
stocked with fruit, snacks and beverages,
baggage transport, sag wagon, daily maps
and cue sheets, marked routes, lectures and
stops at historic sites, welcomes by officials
and civic volunteers in small towns and
villages, masseuses for body repair, and
mechanics for bike repair.
In light of this organization, there
were only a few other logistics to address,
primarily transportation to Buffalo and
housing accommodations during the ride.
Delores and Paula met Nancy and Laura in
Albany. We all drove to Buffalo in a rented
van that we carefully dismantled to
accommodate our bikes and luggage
(Delores had shipped her bike to Buffalo
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from Cincinnati). After getting to Buffalo,
the most important decision we had to
make was where to sleep-or more
accurately, where not to sleep. Most cyclists
set up camp at prearranged sites at local
colleges, high schools, and municipal
parks on the trip. Very early, we decided
against camping, however. Instead we
opted for local B&Bs, hotels, motels, and
dormitories that were listed as housing
alternatives. This meant arranging taxis
at the end of the day and in the morning
back to the breakfast site. This wasn't as
difficult as it seemed it might be, and we
were very grateful for mattresses, some
really good meals, some time away from
the larger group, and a wonderful time
together. We especially appreciated the
hotels and dorms on the nights it rained
hard. With our daily drop-offs and pickups, ourmonikerwas born: We were
dubbed "the princess tour."
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Alittle history goes a long way
Groundbreaking for the Erie Canal
took place onJuly 4, 1817. It began as the
political project of Governor DeWitt
Clinton-"Clinton's Folly." Almost no
professional engineers were involved in the
project. Built at a cost of $7 million, the
Canal was completed in 1825. It was
called the "Eighth Wonder of the World,"
for as one commentator described, "They
have built the longest canal, in the least
time, with the least experience, for the
least money, and to the greatest public
benefit."
The Erie Canal opened the American
West to commerce and travel, bringing
financial prosperity and social change
across New York and the United States. The
inland waterway facilitated trade from the
Mississippi to the Atlantic Ocean. The
original canal featured 18 aqueducts, 83
locks, and a rise of 568 feet from the
Hudson River to Lake Erie. Froman
overland trip that previously took four to
six weeks, the canal cut travel down to five
to seven days. Due to its financial success,
SALTEqualizer

the canal was enlarged four times between
1836 and 1862. Towns grew along the
canal route, and many Western and
Central New York locations remain linked
to their canal beginnings and maintain
originals or replicas of the buildings,
stores, and other facilities that supported
canal traffic.
Although financially successful, the
canal was very costly in terms of human
lives. Thousands of Irish immigrants were
employed to dig the canal by hand, and
many succumbed to malaria and related
diseases. Further, as a 1990 National
Geographic article recounts, "Forgotten
people include immigrant laborers who
worked on the canal, lived under inhumane Gonditions, and died without
rousing much concern. Thousands of
homeless people, escaped slaves, and other
outcasts roamed the canal looking for
work."
In the 1950s, the canal lost business to
autos, trucks, pipelines, railroads, and the
St. Lawrence Seaway. With its future
uncertain, the canal began to deteriorate.
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In modem times, prospects were further
dimmed by the steady decline of the
industrial base of Western and Central New
York, leaving many low- and moderatelyskilled workers without viable employment
opportunities. However, manyof the canal
towns are building on their history as the
path to a resurgent future. In 1983, New
Yorkers voted to restore the canal system for
recreational use, irrigation, wildlife
habitat, hydroelectric power, pleasure boats
and small commercial vessels.
Much of the awesome geographical
beauty of New York remains the same,
except that which was altered to construct
the canal. Links to the past and present are
ever-evident. Along the Mohawk River, for
instance, Hiawatha united competing
tribes into the Iroquois Confederacy in
1600. The Iroquois Confederacy became a
model for U.S. democracy, and Indians in
New York continue to assert their cultural
heritage and influence throughout the
state. Major abolitionist activity took
place along the Erie Canal. Enslaved
Cycling continued onpage 20
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African-Americans risked all for freedom,
and citizens in Syracuse and other canal
cities defied the Fugitive Slave Act and
refused to return enslaved AfricanAmericans to the South. Also, the women's
rights movement burgeoned in Seneca
Falls, eventually spreading across the state
and the nation. Thus, the bike tour along
the Erie Canal was an opportunity to slow
down and appreciate New York's historical,
cultural, and physical landscape.

That depends on what your definition of "flat" is
The tour was billed as a "ride," not a
"race." Clearly, though, everyone had
different goals and expectations for
embarking on the trip. For some it was
starting, for others it was finishing. Speed
was the goal for some riders, while others
sought consistent pacing. Some, like the
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man who celebrated the second anniversary
after his heart attack by riding the tour,
were just happy to be alive. All of us were
happy to be there. Individually and
together we pedaled, pushed, groaned and
grunted our way across New York on our
bicycles.
While we shared housing and meals
most nights, we never felt cramped or
imposed upon. This was good because we
quickly realized the differences in our
circadian rhythms. Delores andNancy
were early risers; Laura and Paula were
dedicated sleepers. Nancy and Laura were
usually on their bikes earlier than Paula
and Delores. We typically saw each other
at breakfast, along the trail, at rest stops,
and at the end of the day's ride. So there
was a good mix of being together and also
hanging out with others on the tour.
There were over 400 riders on the tour.
It was a wide-ranging group of folks of all
ages, sizes, physical abilities, geographical
backgrounds, and cycling experience.
Many were veterans of long-distance bike
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rides, while others, like us, were cycling
enthusiasts but neophytes at long tours.
Gender balance seemed pretty equal, but
there wasn't much racial or ethnic
diversity-our group provided most of that.
The gay and lesbian community was well
represented, and there were many family
configurations. There were LGBT and
straight couples, mothers and sons, fathers
and daughters, straight and LGBT parents
with infants and toddlers, and grandparents with grandchildren.
On this trip, the most prominent
diversity was reflected in the vehicle of
choice. Here, there was an eclectic
assortment of bicycle types to match the
assorted riders. There were racing bikes,
touring bikes, mountain bikes, and
hybrids. There were folding bikes! There
were tandems and recumbents, and
tandem recumbents. There were bikes with
children in tow or child seats in front.
Some rode with loaded panniers, while
others carried only water bottles and
snacks.
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Local people were fascinated by our
gang of riders. When we rode on city
streets, people stopped and watched the
seemingly endless trail of cyclists. In local
restaurants, people asked about the tour
and us, and talked at length about
themselves, their towns, and what we could
expect during that portion of the trip. Our
interactions with local folks were almost
entirely positive, although there were nasty
brushes with aggressive drivers. One night
a friendly cab driver suggested a
sightseeing tip and offered to take us to the
town's bar strip. But our raucous laughter
in the taxi-without alcohol-convinced
him that we didn't need to visit the bars
and he recommended taking us directly to
our hotel. Talking about the events of the
day and watching the weather channel
became our favorite entertainment!
We generally rode for six to eight hours
a day, in all conceivable weather and road
conditions. Heavy rains the night before
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made the next day either torrid or brisk.
We also had our share of mishaps on the
bikes. Delores and Nancy each had two
flats. One rider set a tour record of four
flats in one day on the same tire; we tried
to stay away from him! The extreme heat
bothered Delores; Laura had an allergic
reaction to insect repellent; Paula
experienced hand numbness and a sore
knee; and Nancy deserved a medal for
persevering despite having tom a ligament
in her hand during a training ride before
the trip and taking a hard spill on wet
railroad tracks during the trip. Undeterred,
we rode through these discomforts.
We groused a bit about the terrain.
The tour booklet had stated, "There are a
few rolling hills and two long, gradual
climbs in the Mohawk Valley." In fact,
therewere numerous steep hills, including
several successive long climbs in the
Mohawk Valley. In this regard, Friday was
the most challenging day of the tour, as we
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rode through head winds, heavy rain, and
long winding roads. It also was a 70-mile
day, the end of which required riding up a
perpendicular road to reach dinner at the
campground. With just two days left,
Friday's travails generated the first serious
talk of quitting by some of the riders. A
few folks opted for the sag wagon, but most
of us cycled on, wind, rain, hills and all.
Magnificent vistas compensated for
any difficulties along the route. Zooming
downhill had the incomparable feeling of
flight and freedom. No matter what the
place or pace, it was better to be on a bike.
Traveling by bicycle awakened all of our
senses, and we took stock after the trip.
Here is our list of some of the best and
worst:
Laura

Best smell- Strawberry fields in Amish
country
Worst smell-The EconoLodge in
Cycling continued on page22
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Canajoharie ("like a combination of bug
spray, mildew, sour milk, and stinky feet")
Nancy
Best sound-Crowd's applause under
balloons at the end of the ride in Albany
Worst sound-Helmet (on head)
hitting pavement after a fall
Delores
Worst taste-Gatorade
Best taste-Gatorade
Paula
Best sight-Lush green farmland in
Amish country
Worst sight-Assorted animal roadkill
Nancy
Worst touch-Skin scraping pavement
Delores
Best touch-The whirlpool
Laura
Best touch-Peddling and downshifting
Paula
Best touch-Any mattress any night
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during the tour
Nancy
Worst overall-Hills on Rt. SS out of
Little Falls (Mohawk Valley)
Laura
Best overall-Finishing ahead of the
paint guy marking directions on the road,
and not thinking about work
Delores
Best overall-Barbeque after Friday
ride
Paula
Best Overall-Time on the bike and
spending time with the "princesses"

I can't believe I rode the whole
thing!
From July 6 to 13, we traveled the
following schedule:
Sunday,July 6: Buffalo to Medina (50
miles)
Monday, July 7: Medina to Pittsford
(60miles)
Tuesday, July 8: Pittsford to Waterloo
(60miles)
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Wednesday, July 9:Waterloo/Seneca
Falls to Syracuse (50 miles)
Thursday, July 10: Syracuse to Rome
(SO miles)
Friday,July 11: Rome to Canajoharie
(70miles)
Saturday,July 12: Canajoharie to
Schenectady (50 miles)
Sunday,July 13: Schenectady to Albany
(30miles)
The final day of the ride was a
beautiful summer day. We also enjoyed
some of the easiest terrain; it was mostly
downhill or level and smooth. We cruised
through the finish line with energy to
spare. We felt tremendous joy and
accomplishment at completing the trek.
We were further gratified to know that our
trip benefitted SALT's work. Our final
mileage exceeded 400 miles, and thanks to
SALT members, we raised nearly $5,000 for
the Dorsen Fund. We thank everyone who
encouraged us on the ride, and everyone
who contributed to the Dorsen Fund.
Look out for cyclists; we may come to a
town near you!
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Committee News

Bar Exam Committee
Plans October Conference
Eileen Kaufman, Touro Law Center

The Bar Exam Committee is planning a
mini-conference for October 11, 2003, at
the University of Minnesota Law School, to
coincide with SALT's next Board of
Governors' meeting. SALT held its first bar
exam conference in San Francisco in 1999,
entitled "Re-examining the Bar Examination," which focused on a critique of the
current bar examination. The October 11,
2003, conference, "Reconceiving the Bar
Examination: Exploring Alternative
Licensing Mechanisms," moves from a
critique of the bar exam to a more activist
agenda that focuses on alternatives to the
bar exam and strategies for adopting more
effective licensing approaches.
The morning session will feature
speakers describing alternative licensing

approaches, including Canada's postgraduate skills training, Arizona's
"Americorps" proposal and Kris Glen's
public service alternative. The session
will also explore the formulation of
performance-based evaluations. SALT is
particularly interested in hearing from
clinicians and others who have successfully
developed and utilized portfolios of
competencies and performance-based
evaluations and who have ideas about
incorporating these approaches in
licensing proposals (please contact Eileen
Kaufman at eileenk@tourolaw.edu).The
afternoon session will focus on re(orm
efforts in several jurisdictions in which
alternatives to the bar exam are currently
being discussed.
In related news, Georgia State University is planning a symposium entitled
"Rethinking the Licensing of New
Attorneys -An Exploration of Alternatives
to the Bar Exam." The Symposium will be
held on January 29, 2004, and will result
in a special issue of the Georgia State
University Law Review devoted to articles
exploring in detail the practical questions
raised by proposals for alternative methods
for licensing lawyers.

Filler Fund Committee Seeks Nominations
Chris lijima, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i

There have been a number of informal discussions recently about how best to fund and
implement the Filler Fund, named as a memorial to Stuart (a beloved law teacher and SALT
treasurer) and Ellen Filler. The $2,200 in funds to pay for a student to work during the
summer with a social justice organization have come predominantly from the SALT treasury
($2,000) and have been supplemented by the Fund. Last year, a decision was made to not
award a summer stipend, in part to allow the Fund to build and in even greater part to
reorganize and redefine how to continue with it. In these last months of increasing financial
pressure for SALT, there has been some initial talk of trying to find ways in which the Fund
could become more self-sufficient.
In the meantime, there is an expectation that we will again award another grant this year
and we are soliciting from our members names of worthy organizations to which we could
send a summer grant to hire a law student.
Nominations should be sent to Chris Iijima (iijimac@hawaii.edu) and come with a
description of the group and its relationship to SALT's commitment to social justice, its need,
and its ability to supervise. The group should be law-related but the grant is not restricted to
direct legal service work.
SALT Equalizer
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SALT Salary Survey: Where
Have All the Numbers
Gone?
Howard A. Glickstein, Touro Law Center

SALT has been publishing a Salary Survey
for over a quarter of a century. The Survey
was undertaken as a means of providing
information to those contemplating
entering law teaching; those already in
teaching; and law school and university
administrators. There is usually great
demand for copies of each year's Survey,
including requests from the press. The
Survey serves an extremely useful purpose.
I am disappointed that the number of
schools cooperating in the Survey has
declined in recent years.
For many years, the Section of Legal
Education, as part of its annual questionnaire, requested salary data. Unlike most
of the other data collected, the salary data
was "confidential." Only law school deans
who consented to abide by the confidentiality restrictions received copies of the
completed survey. Law schools that did not
provide their salary data did not receive
information about the other law schools.
One of the issues at stake when the Justice
Department sued the American Bar
Association, alleging that the accreditation
process violated the antitrust laws, was the
collection and dissemination of salary
data. As part of the consent decree ending
the litigation, the ABA agreed to discontinue the collection of salary data. The
Justice Department made clear that
nothing would prevent a private organization from collecting salary data.
Since the ABA stopped collecting salary
data, there has been a steady decline in the
response to our Survey. Some law schools
claim that, as long as they compiled the
data for the ABA, they did not mind
furnishing it to us. (It is difficult to
believe that some law schools no longer
maintain faculty salary data.) Some law
schools might have felt some pressure to
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release salary data to the ABA. Most feel
less urgency to respond to a request from
SALT.
We have tried to confront the nonresponse problem in a number of ways.
First, we have asked SALT members to put
pressure on their deans to respond to the
Salary Survey (a list of non-responding
schools appears at the end of this column).
Second, we have asked SALT members at
non-responding schools to see if they could
obtain data and furnish it to us. (At one
non-responding school, the dean was
outraged when a faculty member provided
us with salary data that the dean had
declined to disclose. I assume that the
dean's face turned red when I informed
him that the faculty member obtained the
salary data from the provost of the
university and had not stolen it from the
dean's desk drawer.)
We especially reminded faculty
members at public institutions, where
salary data generally is made public, that
with a little bit of research they probably
could find the information for us. Finally,
we have tried to do some internet research
on our own, with limited success.
Once again, I urge all SALT members
to do what they can to encourage their
schools to furnish us with salary data or to
take some time to see if they can uncover
the salary data on their own. The
reluctance of law schools to disclose salary
data is just another example of the special
privileges to which law schools and their
faculties feel entitled. There are few job
classifications for which salary data is kept
confidential. We know the salaries of
government officials, of judges, of many
lawyers in major law firms, of athletes, of
movie stars, and of scores of other professionals and non-professionals. I may be
missing something, but if the Mets know
what the Yankees are paying their players,
why shouldn't Columbia know what stars
at NYU get paid, and vice versa? I guess law
schools and law faculties are just different.

Schools that have not responded
to the SALT salary survey:
Committee News
Alabama
George Mason
American University George
Arizona
Washington
Barry
Georgetown
Notre Dame
ThomasJefferson
Baylor
Harvard
Pace
Tulane
Boston College
Hofstra
Pennsylvania
UC Berkeley
Boston University
Howard
Pepperdine
UC Davis
Brigham Young
Illinois
Quinnipiac
UCIA
Brooklyn
Indiana (Bloomington) Richmond
Utah
Cal Western
JAG
Roger Williams
Vanderbilt
Case Western Reserve Kansas
St. John's
Villanova
Catholic-DC
Kentucky
Saint Louis
Virginia
Chicago
Lewis & Clark
St. Mary's
Wake Forest
Chicago-Kent
Loyola (Chicago)
San Diego
Washington and Lee
Cincinnati
Loyola (Los Angeles) San Francisco
Washington (St. Louis)
Columbia
Maine
Santa Clara
Western State
Cornell
McGeorge
South Carolina
Whittier
Cumberland (Samford) Miami
Southern California Widener
DePaul
Minnesota
Southern Methodist William & Mary
Detroit-Mercy
New England
Southwestern
Willamette
Duke
New York Law
Stanford
Wisconsin
Fordham
NYU
SUNY Buffalo
Yale
Franklin Pierce
North Carolina Central Stetson
Northwestern
Temple

Judicial Nominations: The Hits Just Keep On Coming
Bob Dinerstein, American University, Washington College of Law

The good news-bad news story of the Bush Administration's judicial nominations goes on,
and SALT continues to play both a public and behind-the-scenes role in bringing to the
attention of key actors the extremist views of so many of these nominees.
First, the good news, such as it is. As of this writing (late July), Senate Democrats
continue to filibuster successfully against two of the Administration's problematic nominees: Miguel Estrada, a nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and Justice Priscilla Owen, a nominee for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Senate has rejected cloture on Estrada five times (most recently on May 6, 2003) and on
Owen once (on May 1, 2003). As you know from previous reports in the Equalizer, SALT, both
organizationally and through individual members, has actively opposed both nominees.
Another bit of good news is what did not happen this summer-the retirement of any
current Supreme Court Justice. While it is not completely out of the question for aJustice to
retire after the end of the term, the speculation that one or possibly two Justices would
announce their retirements byJune 30 turned out to be inaccurate. In light of the nature of
its nominees to the district and circuit courts, there is little reason to think that the Bush
Administration would have appointed someone within the mainstream to the vacant slot(s).
Because of the relationship between Supreme Court nominations and presidential electoral
Judicial continued on page 26
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SALT Awards Dinner Date
Set; Award Nominees
Sought
Bob Dinerstein, American University,
Washington College of Law

This year's SALT Annual Awards Dinner will
take place in conjunction with the AALS
annual meeting in Atlanta on Monday
evening, January 5 (reception starts at 7:00
p.m.; dinner starts at 7:30p.m.).
Because of the way the calendar falls
this year, the AALS schedule is somewhat
different from that of recent years. Instead
of going from Thursday to Sunday, the
conference goes from Saturday to Tuesday.
After polling the Board, the Committee
concluded that having the dinner on
Monday evening, the traditional point in
the conference if not the traditional day of
the week, presented the fewest conflicts for
attendance at the dinner. Our informal
survey of law schools revealed that most
schools will not be starting classes on that
Monday, so conflict with external schedules should be minimized. As of this
writing, we have not yet identified a
location for the dinner, but we have a lead
on a place to hold the event.
The Committee is responsible for
recommending to the Board of Directors
recipients for two important awards. The
SALT Teaching Award is an annual award
given for special contributions to the
teaching mission of the legal academy.
Last year's winners were long-time SALT
stalwarts Chuck Lawrence and Mari
Matsuda of Georgetown University Law
Center. Prior recent winners have included
Sylvia Law, Marjorie Schultz, Tony
Amsterdam, Jim Jones, Haywood Burns,
BarbaraAldave and Trina Grillo. The Award
has been given every year since 1976 (the
SALT Equalizer

first winner was David Cavers) and
twice has gone to an institution
(CUNY Law School and University of
Wisconsin Law School) rather than to
an individual.
The second award is the SALT Human
Rights Award. This award, which is not
necessarily given every year, recognizes the
extraordinary work of an individual or
organization in advancing the principles
of equality and equal access to legal
education, the legal profession and legal
services. This award was created in 1997
after the death of Shanara Gilbert, who
died in South Africa (in the same bus
accident as Haywood Bums) while forging
connections between clinical legal
education and human rights advocacy in
that country. Last year, the award went to
anti-death penalty advocates Stephen
Bright, Director of the Southern Center for
Human Rights, and Bryan Stevenson,
Executive Director of the Equal Justice
Initiative of Alabama. Previous recipients
of the award have been Dr. Jesse Stone.Jr.,
Congressman Barney Frank and Ibrahim
Gassama.
In recent years, an important part of
the dinner (and the fund-raising necessary
to defray its costs while keeping the cost to
attendees down) has been the program and
the advertisements that law schools,
individual or groups of law faculty, and
others have taken out in support of SALT or
the award winners. We would like to make
a special effort this year to increase the
number of advertisements, and we
encourage you and your law schools to
participate. And remember, you and your
law school can show your support for our
awardees even if they are not from your
own institution. You will be receiving
more information on the listserv regarding
how to purchase an advertisement, the
cost, and other logistics.
Nominations-which should be
received by Friday, September 26, 2003-for
either or both awards should be submitted
to either of the Committee's Co-Chairs,
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who can be reached as follows:
Margalynne Armstrong,
Associate Professor
Santa Clara University School of Law
500 El Camino Real
Santa Clara, CA 95053
(408) 554-4778 (o)
(408) 554-4426 (fax)
marmstrong@scu.edu
Robert Dinerstein
Professor and Associate Dean
for Academic Affairs
American University,
Washington College of Law
4801 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20016
(202) 274-4141 (o)
(202) 274-4015 (fax)
rdiners@wcl.american.edu
While not a formal part of the
nomination process, a letter or e-mail in
support of the nominee would assist the
Committee in making its recommendations to the Board. Thanks for your help.

Judicial:
continuedfrom page 25

politics, even if there is a vacancy on the
Court one year from now it is not at all
clear that the Administration would be
able to fill the slot prior to the election. So,
at least for now, the Court may not be any
worse for the foreseeable future. It is a
measure of our current political predicament that retention of a Court as conservative as this one (Grutter, Lawrence, and
Hibbs notwithstanding) is seen as a
positive development.
Afinal bit of good news is that, thus
far, Republican efforts to change the rules
on filibustering nominations and other
nomination procedures have been
unsuccessful. Again, the irony of people in
favor of civil rights being thankful for the
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filibuster is quite striking.
to the bad news. One Bush
nominee to the federal bench is worse than
the next, and despite the efforts of
numerous organizations and individuals,
a number of very conservative activists,
with strong anti-progressive records, have
been confirmed for judgeships. Since our
last report, the Senate has confirmed such
troubling nominees as Deborah Cook and
Jeffrey Sutton (both for the Sixth Circuit)
and John Roberts (for the D.C. Circuit).
The Senate Judiciary Committee has voted
to send to the Senate floor Judge Carolyn
Kuhl (for the Ninth Circuit) and Alabama
Attorney General William Pryor (for the
Eleventh Circuit; see below). The President
also has continued to nominate (or
indicated his intention to do so) a number
of extremely conservative individuals to
important judgeships, including Deputy
Secretary of Health and Human Services
Claude Allen (Fourth Circuit), and, for the
D.C. Circuit, Justice Janice Rogers Brown of
the California Supreme Court (where,
among other things, she wrote the opinion
upholding a broad interpretation of
California's anti-affirmative action
Proposition 209) and Brett Kavanaugh (a
key assistant to Independent Counsel
Kenneth Starr, and Assistant White House
counsel, with a major role in advocating
the Bush judicial nominations).
On July 23, the Senate Judiciary
Committee, on a straight party-line 10-9
vote, voted to send William Pryor's
nomination to the Senate floor. Pryor may
be the most extreme Bush judicial
nominee thus far. Despite allegations from
a staff member that the Republican
Attorneys General Association, which Pryor
helped to form, arranged for sitting state
attorneys-general to solicit corporate
executives in their states for campaign
contributions (a fact that Pryor denied at
his confirmation hearing), theJudiciary
Committee saw fit to report out the
nomination.
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The SALT-Board approved a letter of
opposition to Pryor's nomination,
which was delivered to the Senate
Judiciary Committee before its consideration of the Pryor nomination. (See the
letteron page 28.) In addition, weemailed SALT members from law schools in
Pennsylvania to ask them to contact
Senator Arlen Spector (R-PA), amemberof
the Judiciary Committee reported to be "on
the fence" regarding the nomination, to
express their opposition to Pryor's nomina-

"[D j] espite the efforts

ofnumerous
organizations and
individuals, a number
ofvery conseroative
activists, with strong
anti-progressive
records, have been
confirmedfor
judgeships. "
tion. Anumber of SALT members sent such
messages of opposition to Senator Spector.
While he voted to report out the nomination, Spector indicated that he had not yet
decided how he would vote if the nomination comes to a vote on the Senate floor.
There are strong indications that the
Democrats will filibuster the Pryor
nomination if it is brought up for a vote,
unless they conclude that there are enough
Republican defectors to yield victory on a
straight up-and-down vote.
[Editor's note: After this article was
submitted for publication, the author sent
the following e-mail to the SALT Board on
July 31, 2003: "The Senate failed to
override a filibuster today on the nomination of William Pryor. The vote was 53-47
for Pryor (Democrats Nelson from
Nebraska and Miller from Georgia were the
Page 27

Committee News
only Democrats to vote for him), 7votes
short of the 60 needed for cloture. I believe
this means that Spector voted for the
nomination-so much for his voting for
Pryor in committee but not being
committed to voting for him on the floor.
The Senate also has failed to invoke
cloture for a seventh time for the Estrada
nomination (5 votes short) and for the
third time for the Owen nomination. The
Republicans plan to bring up Carolyn
Kuhl (9th Circuit) for a floor vote
tomorrow. Then, mercifully, they are on
recess until Labor Day."]
Thanks to our friends at the Alliance
for Justice's IndependentJudiciary Project
(and the very helpful e-mails from KendraSue Derby, Director of Field Operations for
the Alliance), the SALT Judicial Nominations Committee is able to monitor these
nominations closely. It is particularly
important that SALT weigh in against
nominations where the nominee has taken
a stance inimical to legal, social and
political issues close to SALT's heart (and
about which SALT members have special
expertise). We easily could justify opposing
virtually every one of the Bush
Administration's nominees, but limited
time (and a desire to focus on the most
problematic nominees) counsels against
such a scatter-shot approach. The Committee welcomes your input on judicial
nominees and any assistance, including
drafting of positions in opposition to some
or all of a nominee's views, that you are in
a position to provide. In addition, as
Senators tend to be more responsive to their
constituents (even law professors!) than
other individuals or groups, we urge you to
respond to our requests to contact your
Senators when a particular nominee or
pending vote warrants it.
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Committee News
Following is the text of a letter sent
on behalfofthe SALT Board by CoPresidents Michael Rooke-Ley and
Paula Johnson to the Senate judiciary
Committee on July 16, 2003.
Dear Senators Hatch and Leahy:
On behalf of the Society of American
Law Teachers ("SALT"), the largest
organization of law professors in the
United States, representing over 800 law
professors from over 150 law schools, we
write to express our strong opposition to
the nomination of William H. Pryor, Jr., to
a seat on the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit.
In our judgment, Attorney General
Pryor is an extreme advocate of a "turnback-the clock" form of federalism that
threatens to undermine the basic constitutional rights of, among others, children,
women, people with disabilities, gays and
lesbians, and senior citizens. Through the
positions he has taken in various cases,
both in representing the State of Alabama
as a party and as an amicus curiae, he
has shown insensitivity to such basic
constitutional rights as the right to
privacy, the separation of church and state,
the Commerce Clause, and the Eighth
Amendment. He also has expressed
hostility to such important congressional
enactments as the Clean Water Act, the
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the
Violence Against Women Act. When linked
to his well-documented intemperateness,
his positions belie his claim that, if
confirmed, he will simply follow the
applicable law, ignoring the values he
obviously holds dear.
Attorney General Pryor has made active
use of the amicus curiae brief to
SALT Equalizer

propagate his extreme positions. He
filed a brief in the recent Supreme
Court case of Lawrence v. Texas, 2003
U.S. Lexis 5013 June 23, 2003), which
struck down Texas's sodomy statute. In
the brief, he argued that reversal of the
lower-court decision (which the Supreme
Court in fact did) would entail protection
for "prostitution, adultery, necrophilia,
bestiality, possession of child pornography
and even incest and pedophilia.. .. " He
filed the lone state amicus curiae brief to
argue for a weakening of the Clean Water
Act in Solid Waste Agency ofNorthern
Cook County v. United States Corps of
Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). He filed a
brief unsuccessfully opposing recognition
of the Family and Medical Leave Act as a
valid exercise of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the recent case of Nevada Dep 't of
Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct.
1972 (2003). He also filed a brief inAtkins
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), against
recognition of mental retardation as a
disqualifying condition for application of
the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment. Once again, the Supreme
Court ruled against the position he
advocated.
Mr. Pryor has sought to participate in
various challenges to the constitutionality
of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), which proscribes
discrimination on the basis of disability in
state and local programs. He has filed
amicus curiae briefs in two cases
challenging the constitutionality of Title
II, Yeskey v. Pennsylvania, 524 U.S. 206
(1998) (where the Court rejected his view),
and Medical Bd of California Hasan,
No. 02-479, cert. dismissed, 173 S. Ct.
1779 (2003). The issue of Title II's
continuing validity remains very alive as
the Supreme Court has granted certiorari
in another Title II case to be heard next
term, Tennesseev. Lane, No. 02-1667,
cert. granted, 2003 U.S. Lexis4818 (June
23, 2003).
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In cases where the Court has adopted
the result Attorney General Pryor's amicus
curiae briefs have sought, his positions
suggest his hostility to key pieces of federal
legislation. For example, he filed the only
amicus curiae brief on behalf of a state
against the constitutionality of the
Violence Against Women Act in United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
He also filed a brief in opposition to the
constitutionality of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Kimel v.
Florida Board ofRegents, 528 U.S. 62
(2000).
Attorney General Pryor has called Roe
v. Wade "the worst abomination of
constitutional law in our history." He has
supported the judicial display of the Ten
Commandments in the courtroom and the
invocation of Christian prayers before the
impaneling of juries. He has defended
Alabama's practice of tying inmates to
hitching posts for long periods of time, a
practice the Supreme Court called
"degrading and dangerous" and
"obvious[ly] cruel." Hopev. Pelzer, 122 S.
Ct. 2508 (2002). He has praised the
extremist decision of Westside Mothers v.
Haveman, 133 F.Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Mich.
2001), rev 'din relevantpart, 289 F. 33d
852 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 154 L. Ed. 2d
516 (2002), a case where the district court
would have held that congressional
legislation passed pursuant to the
Spending Power is not the "supreme law of
the land" for purposes of the Supremacy
Clause. He argued unsuccessfully for
vacating a consent decree (entered into by
his predecessor) in a case concerning the
care and custody of foster children in
Alabama despite the fact that the state had
not complied with the decree. R. C v.
Nachman, 969 F.Supp. 682 (M.D. Ala.
1997).Apparently unconcerned about
whether his position would harm vulnerable children in the state's care, he noted,
"My job is to make sure that the state of
Alabama isn't run by federal courts.... My
job isn't to come here and help children."
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Attorney General Pryor's litigation
positions have had consequences far
beyond his desire to protect Alabama's
interests as he sees them. In Board of
Trustees ofthe University ofAlabama v.
Garrett, 531 U.S.356 (2001), he successfully argued that Title I of the ADA was not
a constitutional exercise of Congress's
power under Section 5of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and thus could not override
the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from damage actions brought by
individuals. This decision has significantly
hamstrung the reach and effectiveness of
the ADA. On remand for consideration of
whether plaintiffs could pursue a claim
under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act, the Attorney General argued that the
state had not knowingly waived its
Eleventh Amendment immunity in
accepting federal funds, and hence could
not be sued under this statute either, a
position that the district court accepted.
(The case is once again on appeal.) The
inescapable conclusion is that Attorney
General Pryor believes the federal govern-

ment has virtually no role to playin
enforcement of well-established
principles of non-discrimination on the
basis of disability.
The Attorney General's zealotry is not
limited to trenching upon the rights of
people with disabilities. He was responsible
for litigating Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001), which limited the relief
available to plaintiffs suing under Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Sandoval's
conclusion that the Title VI regulations
cannot address disparate impact is a major
blow to civil rights enforcement.
As law professors, we would be the last
people to criticize lawyers for zealous
advocacy of their clients' causes, even if we
disagreed with those clients' positions. But
Attorney General Pryor's views go well
beyond those necessary to represent his
client zealously. He has sought out, and
staked out, a position as the prime
defender of an extraordinarily limited view
of federal power that would have the effect
of undoing legal developments that date
not only from the New Deal but from the

Finally...ATextbook on
Social Justice

Clara), entitled "Cases and Materials on
Social]ustice: Professionals, Communities, and Law."
As the authors observe, "[[m] embers of
the legal academy-in classrooms and
clinics-have sought to teach about social
justice in law schools because students
want to know how they can work with the
people who most need them." With this
comprehensive and wide-ranging 1100page volume, we have been given just the
tool we need to teach and inspire a new
generation of lawyers to work with
marginalized, subordinated and
underrepresented clients and causes.
Nearly 150 contributors-including
many of you- have brought varied
experiences and perspectives from practice,
the academy and the bench. Reading so
many excerpts from so many different

SALT Co-President Michael Rooke-Ley,
Seattle University School of Law (visiting
2003-04)

Given the years-dare I say decades-of talk
and more talk among SALT members at
our conferences and workshops about the
need for "social justice" materials, about
course development, about curricular
reform, about providing something we
can really work with ... well, it's time for
some celebration and recognition.
Within the conventional, brown, hard
covers of Thomson West, you will find the
extraordinary work of SALT Board member
Mamie Mahoney (Miami),John Calmore
(North Carolina), and former SALT CoPresident Stephanie Wildman (Santa
SALT Equalizer
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time of Reconstruction. His views should
be particularly troubling for members of
Congress who have played keyroles in
sponsoring the various pieces of legislation
he has opposed with such vehemence. Mr.
Pryor is entitled to his views, and the
people of Alabama, if they choose to do so,
are entitled to re-elect him to public office.
But the Senate Judiciary Committee
should exercise its advise and consent
power to keep those views from being
foisted on litigants in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
and on the broader bodypolitic. We urge
the Committee in the strongest possible
terms to reject this nomination.
Sincerely,
Michael Rooke-Ley
Paula C. Johnson
Co-Presidents
Society of American Law Teachers
authors could be daunting, confusing and
frustrating were it not for the careful and
thoughtful commentaries ("Notes and
Questions"), which so effectively tie the
materials together.
Here is a casebook that is already being
used enthusiastically for large first-year
courses on law, values and social justice;
for small, upper-division electives on
public interest lawyering; or simply as an
invaluable resource for the rest of us who
may wish to cherry-pick pieces and
chapters for all that we do.
AskStephanie (swildman@scu.edu),
Mamie (mmahoney@law.miami.edu), or
John (jcalmore@email.unc.edu) to send
you their 14-page Table of Contents. It's
quite a tour de force. You'll be impressed.
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Rooke-Ley Rallies Political
Activists
The following excerpts are from a speech
that SALT Co-President Michael RookeLey gave to a gathering of 400 political
activists in Eugene, Oregon on July 20,
2003.
The folks who have come together tonight
are dedicated activists, who have worked for
so many years to bring out the best in
America. These are patriots who know the
difference between community-building
and empire-building.
These days, in our state capitol as well
as our nation's capitol, our social priorities
have been turned upside down.While
precious lives are lost and billions are spent
for a war we don't want, Oregonians in
need have become increasingly desperate in
the face of drastic social service cutbacks;
our system of justice has been forced to
close one door after another; and our kids'
school year-already the shortest in the
nation-is shortened even further. Overworked teachers face classes that are much
too large; programs are being cut right and
left; my own kids don't have textbooks to
take home anymore ....
Here in Oregon and across America, we
need jobs. We don't need NAFTA or the
WfO-we need industry here and trade
treaties abroad which respect workers'
rights, human rights and the environment. . ..
We need a new direction. We need
candidates for public office who are
willing to speak out on these issues.
While we are deeply gratified by two
recent Supreme Court decisions regarding
affirmative action and regarding the right
of privacy for the gay and lesbian communities, we know that the Bush Administration and its conservative base are gearing
up to avenge those losses through their
nominees to the federal bench. These are

SALT Equalizer

lifetime appointments, so the time to
fight these battles is now.... We need
judges who believe in the principles of
justice and equality, who respect choice,
and who reflect the diversity of
America....
On the international front, the
progressive community recognizes that the
Bush Administration is simply "out of
control." Time after time, this Administra-

"Time after time, [the
Bushj administration
has displayed an
arrogance, an
adolescent pugnacity,
that is not just
embarrassing, but
truly damaging on a
global scale. With its
Wild West rhetoric and
blatant disinterest in
nurturing a
community of
nations, it has
fostered a level of
resentment and
hatredfor America
unparalleled in our
lifetime. In the words
ofour home-made
protest signs, this
'mad cowboy disease
could kill us all. "'
tion has displayed an arrogance, an
adolescent pugnacity, that is not just
embarrassing, but truly damaging on a
global scale. With its Wild West rhetoric
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and blatant disinterest in nurturing a
community of nations, it has fostered a
level of resentment and hatred for America
unparalleled in our lifetime. In the words
of our home-made protest signs, this "mad
cowboy disease could kill us all."
People all over the world have suffered
at the hands of this Administration. Let us
count the ways:
•rejection of the Kyoto Accords;
•absence from the Durban Conference
on Human Rights;
•rejection of the Biological and
Chemical Weapons Convention;
•unilateral termination of the ABM
Treatywith Russia;
•active opposition to the creation of
the International Criminal Court;
•promulgation of a "pre-emption"
doctrine, justifying military intervention
whenever we wish and setting a horrifying
precedent for rogue nations of the world;
•the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq,
sold on the basis of exaggerations and
fabrications and without U.N. authorization; and now
•the awarding of massive re-building
contracts to the likes of Bechtel and
Halliburton.
This is an outrage-a scandal of
enormous proportions. ... And, yes, we
need a new direction ... .
Finally, let's remind ourselves that this
is a community which has gone on record
in opposition to the PATRIOT Act, thanks
to the work of so many of you seated here
tonight. Our work must continue,
spreading the word to communities across
the nation about the insanity of sacrificing our civil liberties in the name of
security.
There is, I'm afraid, no rest for the
weary. The political times have never been
worse, the stakes have never been higher.
We must meet the challenge and reclaim
the very best of America.
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Norman Dorsen Fellowship

PLEDGE FORM
Yes! I want to support the Nonnan Dorsen Fellowship. Over the next five years I promise to make the tax deductible contributions at
the following level:
- - Distinguished Contributor ($1,500 total, or $300 a year)
--Honored Contributor ($1,000 total, or $200 a year)
- - Sustaining Contributor ($500 total or $100 a year)
- - Contribution (other) $_ _ _ _ per year

Or:
- - One-Time Contribution $ - - - Name----------------- School-----------------Address------------------------------------Phone----------------- E-Mail-----------------Make your check payable to: SALT, designated to the Dorsen Fund on the notation line, and mail to: Sylvia A. Law, NYU Law School, 40
Washington Sq. So., New York, N.Y. 10012.
The contribution is tax deductible.
Nonnan Dorsen Fellowship Committee: David Chambers, Howard Glickstein, Phoebe Haddon, Sylvia A. Law, Charles R. Lawrence, Avi Soifer,
and Wendy Webster Williams.
L----------------------------------------~

r----------------------------------------1

Society of American Law Teachers
Membership Application (or renewal)

Enroll/renew me as a Regular Member. I enclose $50 ($35 for those earning less than $30,000 per year).
Enroll/renew me as a Contributing Member. I enclose $100.
Enroll/renew me as a Sustaining Member. I enclose $300.
I enclose

($100, $150, $200, or $250) to prepay my dues for _ _ _ years ($50 each year).

Enroll me as a Lifetime Member. I enclose $750.
I am contributing $___ to the Stuart and Ellen Filler Fund to support public interest internships.
I am contributing $
Name

as an additional contribution to support SALT's promotion of affirmative action.
School _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Address _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

E-mail _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ZIP Code _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Make checks payable to: Society of American Law Teachers
Mail to: Professor David F. Chavkin
Washington College of Law
American University
4801 Massachusetts Ave. NW
Washington, DC 20016
L----------------------------------------~
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Society of American Law Teachers
Co-Presidents
Paula C. Johnson (Syracuse)
Michael Rooke-Ley (Seattle, visiting)
Co-Presidents-Elect
Beto Juarez (St. Mary's)
Holly Maguigan (NYU)
Past Presidents
Norman Dorsen (NYU)
Howard Lesnick (Pennsylvania)
David L. Chambers (Michigan)
George]. Alexander (Santa Clara)
Wendy W. Williams (Georgetown)
Rhonda R. Rivera (Ohio State)
Emma ColemanJordan (Georgetown)
Charles R. Lawrence III (Georgetown)
Howard A. Glickstein (Touro)
Sylvia A. Law (NYU)
Patricia A. Cain (Iowa)
Jean C. Love (Iowa)
Linda S. Greene (Wisconsin)
Phoebe A. Haddon (Temple)
Stephanie M. Wildman (Santa Clara)
Carol Chomsky (Minnesota)
Margaret E. Montoya (New Mexico)

Past Vice Presidents
Anthony G. Amsterdam (NYU)
Derrick A. Bell, Jr. (NYU)
Gary Bellow (Harvard)
Ralph S. Brown,Jr. (Yale)
Thomas Emerson (Yale)
Treasurer
Norm Stein (Alabama)
Co-Editors
Eric S.Janus (William Mitchell)
Raleigh Hannah Levine (William Mitchell)
Webmaster
Richard Chused (Georgetown)
Historian
Joyce Saltalamachia (New York)
Board of Governors
Alicia Alvarez (DePaul)
Frances Ansley (Tennessee)
Margalynne Armstrong (Santa Clara)
Elvia Arriola (Northern Illinois)
Devon Carbado (UCLA)
Gabriel Chin (Cincinnati)

WILLIAM MITCHELL COLLEGE OF LAW

Margaret Chon (Seattle)
Nancy Cook (Cornell)
Frank Rudy Cooper (Villanova)
Roberto Corrada (Denver)
Robert Dinerstein (American)
Jane Dolkart (Southern Methodist)
Nancy Ehrenreich (Denver)
Neil Gotanda (Western State)
Tanya Hernandez (Rutgers-Newark)
Emily Houh (Northern Kentucky)
Joan Howarth (UNLV)
Chris Iijima (Hawaii)
Jose Juarez Jr. (St. Mary's)
Eileen Kaufman (Touro)
Holly Maguigan (NYU)
Tayyab Mahmud (Cleveland-Marshall)
Martha Mahoney (Miami)
Beverly Moran (Wisconsin)
Nancy Ota (Albany)
Marc Poirier (Seton Hall)
Deborah Waire Post (Touro)
Florence Roisman (Indiana-Indianapolis)
Robert Seibel (CUNY)
Aviam Soifer (Boston College)
Kellye Testy (Seattle)
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